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INTRODUCTION: 
LIQUID LIBERALISM 
 
 In the second century (CE), the cities of Texcoco, Cuicuilco, and Teotihuacán all 
contained densely packed populations of humans in the Valley of Mexico. Texcoco was located 
in the northeast area, Teotihuacán in the north, and Cuicuilco in the southwest. For some time, 
these different peoples traded amongst each other and competed to be the dominant group in 
the Valley. Cuicuilco had a slight lead over Teotihuacán and Texcoco because of its rich water 
supply from rainfall, run-off water, and rivers from the volcanic Ajusco Mountains, which in turn 
produced healthier and more abundant crops. A massive volcanic eruption around 100 CE from 
the Xitle volcano buried Cuicuilco in mountain and ash, effectively wiping them out of the 
economic system and the ancient map of the Valley. The eruption completely obliterated their 
city, covering their crops, burying the best soil in the valley, and poisoning their precious waters. 
As a consequence, the people living around Cuicuilco migrated to the next best area, 
Teotihuacán.1 This area was more developed, centralized, and successful than Texcoco as a 
result, in part, of its having a sustainable and reliable water supply. This area became the new 
leader in the Valley of Mexico, later to be eclipsed by the Mexica Aztec city of Tenochtitlan. 
Located on an island in Lake Texcoco, Tenochtitlan would later become the capital of New 
Spain, finally evolving into the Mexico City we know today.2 
 The people in the Valley of Mexico, then, have a long and trying relationship with their 
environment. The Aztecs, successors to the Teotihuacán culture, were the first to drastically 
reshape the Valley by taking the designs of the Teotihuacán's poorly managed chinampas and 
                                                 
1
 The cause of the fall of Cuicuilco is unknown to scholars, but the explosion of Xitle seemed to have 
finalized the civilization's exit from the Valley. The total collapse of a society tends to be more complex 
than a singular factor, as Jared Diamond argues in Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or 
Succeed (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), but a combination of warring groups, nomadic invasions, 
and environmental depletion mixed with climatic disasters seems to be the most likely explanation. 
2
 Exequiel Ezcurra et al., The Basin of Mexico: Critical Environmental Issues and Sustainability (New York 
and Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1999), 32. 
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corporatizing them from individual use to supporting the city and exporting throughout the 
empire. Also known as “floating gardens,” chinampas are small plots of land in shallow lake 
beds used for agriculture. 3 One of the first things that the Spanish did after conquering 
Tenochtitlan was to fill in the chinampas to make roads in order to move by horseback, mule 
train and other types of transport animals, crops, and precious metals, effectively changing the 
city's environment.4 Even in the early National era, the Revolutionary years, and as late as the 
1970s and 1980s, the governments of Valley of Mexico have tried to control their naturally 
aqueous environment to achieve their various ends. 
 In this expansive history of the relationship between Mexicans and water, I am interested 
in two bodies of water that ran through the Distrito Federal (Federal District) during the 
nineteenth-century. First is the water of a canal in La Viga, a small neighborhood that lies to the 
south of Mexico City. The second is the water that inspired Porfirio Díaz (president, 1876-1911) 
to construct the Gran Canal, which was one of the most influential modernizing projects of the 
nineteenth-century. Although the waters of the Canal de la Viga and the Gran Canal originated 
from the same hydrological system in the Basin of Mexico, they, and the canals that they 
traversed, inspired different reactions from the people who used the hydrological works, 
especially in terms of Mexican state formation and the creation of modern identities.  
 The Canal de la Viga was part of a colonial hydrological project that failed to drain the 
water from the capital city.5 Because of its proximity to the city, the canal was one of the most 
popular places for water vessels of all kinds (some rumored that steamboats used the Canal 
occasionally6) to embark from and move around the city. Although many other water routes lost 
                                                 
3
 Ibid, 34. 
4
 For more on this “ecological conquest,” see Alfred Crosby's The Columbian Exchange: Biological and 
Cultural Consequences of 1492 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1972) as well as his Ecological 
Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004). 
5
 Crosby, The Columbian Exchange, 36. 
6
 Memoria de la obras del sistema de drenaje profundo del Distrito Federal 2, (Mexico City: Departamento 
del Distrito Federal, 1975), 140. 
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their popularity in the nineteenth-century, the Canal de la Viga remained busy, a place where 
people and merchandise were on the move. Its use was not only commercial. Although the 
water inside was foul with the human waste that amassed as it wound its way through 
neighborhoods, the Canal de la Viga remained a preferred spot for locals to use as a market 
ground and for tourists to take a break from the city. 
  The central city itself was no stranger to water or waterworks. Mexico City had no canal 
system that effectively and completely drained its water, which would prove to be a problem 
time and again throughout its history. The streets collected storm water, leaving stagnant pools 
that manifested disease and stench. These waters only ever disappeared in the dry months, 
leaving dust composed of filth and feces that blew around in the dust storms. These wet 
conditions in Mexico City have tormented humans since they began living in the area, and 
because of this the leaders of every major political era (Aztecan, colonial, independence, and 
beyond) unleashed major efforts to control or lead the waters out of the Valley.7 It was not until 
the construction of the massive 30-mile long Gran Canal in 1900 that the Valley was 
considerably—but not entirely—drained and relieved of some of its problems.  
 The leader behind the Gran Canal was the liberal dictator, Porfirio Díaz. When Díaz took 
office in 1876, something changed—a new understanding of people and environment began to 
take shape in conjunction with the evolution of Mexican modernity. Up until the Porfiriato, a term 
used to connote the 35-years that Díaz exerted control over Mexico, the water in the Valley of 
Mexico had worked alongside other factors that deterred state formation. The unruly, invasive, 
flood-prone environment proved to be an obstacle itself as the various governments of Mexico 
attempted to assert themselves over both people and land. Under Díaz, though, a change in 
                                                 
7
 See the second part of the Junta Directiva del Desague del Valle de México's, Memoria histórica, 
técnica y administrativa de las obras del desagüe del Valle de México, 1449-1900 1 (Mexico City: 
Tipografía de la Oficina Impresora de Estampillas, 1902), 31-251. For a discussion that contradicts the 
popular history of the Aztecs having used the waters sustainably and successfully, see “An Old World 
Before it was New,” in Shawn Miller's, An Environmental History of Latin America (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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relationship between people and environment occurred. Economic growth and political 
stabilization symbolized the Porfiriato, and created a kind of “golden age” for Mexicans who 
prospered from it. The country experienced modernization that was heavily influenced by a 
dramatic increase in foreign investment, specifically from Western Europe and the United 
States, in a way that no other previous government had been able to achieve. This is in part 
because of the way that Díaz embraced nineteenth-century liberalism.  
 Both the Gran Canal and the Canal de la Viga exemplify how Porfirians used the 
environment in their project propelling Mexico into the modern, liberal world. The Gran Canal 
made a model of Mexican achievements in technology and understandings of contemporary 
science. The Canal de la Viga grew into a kind of Victorian playground where higher-class 
people go and explore the traditions of Mexico and still experience the comforts of a modern 
world.  
 In this thesis, I propose that Mexican water works during the Porfiriato influenced the 
development of modernity because of hydrology’s link between society and environment. These 
two canals in particular provide a window on the relationship between the state and environment 
that connects the two in the efforts of state formation. The Gran Canal and the Canal de la Viga 
both worked as tools for social and political construction for Mexicans to imagine modernity for 
themselves and for their country. 
 
Liquid Liberalism 
 Porfirio Díaz came into power just as the governments of France, Germany, England, 
and the United States were in the throes of modernization. Industrialization and urbanization 
forced these countries to reconsider the architecture and construction of their cities, as well as 
the formation of their states. Díaz and Mexico became part of this modernization process as 
Mexico City began to experience the same burdens of modernity that confronted places like 
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Paris, New York, London, and Munich, such as over-population, high mortality rates, and public 
health and sanitation issues.8  The problems of urban expansion coupled with the new 
intellectual environment changed nineteenth-century liberalism, the leading political philosophy 
in these countries. Positivism, the belief that any rationally justifiable allegation could be logically 
verified, together with scientific politics, took the liberal notion of the free individual (over the 
corporate entity) who was at liberty to participate in social progress and economic development 
and replaced it with ideas from Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, and “social Darwinism.”9 
 What positivism and the new nineteenth-century liberalism preached was the 
interpretation of society as an organism, in which every person was a responsible member. The 
same model is applied to the economy, in which individuals had assigned roles that needed to 
be fulfilled. The científicos, Díaz's self-named troop of advisers inside his government, argued 
that the only way to understand how a state ran was by revealing, as historian Charles Hale 
wrote, “[the] science of society that followed the procedures and objectives of the science of 
nature.”10 Díaz was sensitive to the way that foreigners interpreted his capital city, as evidenced 
by the vast number of guests and ambassadors that he invited and to the city over the 35-years 
of his rule.11 Therefore, draining the waters of the Valley of Mexico might reveal the natural 
“science of society” that Mexico always had, but was drowned out by the nineteenth-century 
scientific politics that continued to fill the Valley. That is, the Porfirians believed that Mexico had 
the potential to be amongst the modern nations, but it would take a large project that would 
exemplify all the necessary modern traits to prove themselves. The Gran Canal was just such a 
                                                 
8
 Miller, An Environmental History of Latin America, 143. 
9
 Charles Hale, The Transformation of Liberalism in Late Nineteenth-Century Mexico (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1989), 4 and 205. 
10
 Ibid, 206. 
11
 William Beezley, Judas at the Jockey Club and Other Episodes of Porfirian Mexico (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1987), 27. 
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project. 
 It appeared that Mexicans were in a predicament that, had it not been for the saving 
grace of industrialization, might have prevented their entry into the world of modern nations. 
Efforts to industrialize sought to alter and control the Mexican landscape and environment, 
making Mexicans the ultimate victor over an environment that symbolized immorality, filth, 
poverty, and a weak state.12 Díaz pumped millions of pesos into projects to industrialize and 
modernize the nation, such as telegraph lines and railroads, improvements in mining, 
agricultural technology, research in science such as archeology, biology, and geology, as well as 
improvements in public health and hydrology.13 Through its focus on ideas about environment 
and control in the modernizing process, this thesis examines how the Porfirian ideology affected 
conceptions of public health and imaginations of water, resulting in projects that altered the 
environment to look cleaner and, therefore, healthier. It argues that Porfirian hydrology projects 
highlight multiple intersections between projects of social and environmental control in which the 
national character was debated. 
 The Gran Canal, then, exemplified how specific conceptions of modernity prompted 
authorities to undertake water management and hydrological projects. However, the relationship 
between liberal ideology and liberal infrastructure building during the Porfiriato did not always 
line up in such a way that allowed the former to inspire the latter. The chain of events was more 
complicated than that, as the Canal de la Viga demonstrates. In the case of La Viga, the 
environment itself was a protagonist in Mexicans' construction of modernity for themselves and 
                                                 
12
 Carolyn Merchant was the first to pinpoint the idea of humans controlling nature and their 
environmental impact in her book Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution 
(San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1983). 
13
 Mark Overmeyer-Velázquez, Visions of the Emerald City: Modernity, Tradition, and the Formation of 
Porfirian Oaxaca, Mexico (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 61; Mílada Bazant, “La enseñanza 
y la práctica de ingenerio durante del Porfitriato,” Historia Mexicana 3 (1984): 254-297. 
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for their country. 
Water, State, and Self 
 In the wide field of literature about the Basin of Mexico, Claudia Agostoni stands out for 
research about Díaz's modernization of the capital via public health improvements. Her book, 
Monuments of Progress: Modernization and Public Health in Mexico City, 1876-1910, makes the 
argument that effort to control water were linked to Díaz's ideas about the modern state, leading 
me to believe that the unruly environment, itself, was very much involved in the formation of a 
modern Mexican state. Of the Gran Canal, Agostoni writes that, “the draining and cleansing of 
the menacing environment, and thus the conquest of the water that had besieged it throughout 
its history, was seen as an essential requirement for its prosperity and modernity.”14 Whereas 
the Gran Canal is an example of how conceptions of modernity influenced water works and 
hydrology, my thesis takes this argument further by including a case study of the Canal de la 
Viga as an example of how the environment affected people’s conceptions of modernity. This 
example underscores what I argues is a dialectical, back-and-forth relationship between water 
and people—a complicated, living dialogue between environment and society. 
 Water and society influencing one another in a single environment is a key part of this 
thesis, since this relationship affects identity formation and state-building. As Mike Davis shows 
in Ecology of Fear: Los Angeles and the Imagination of Disaster, Los Angeles in the early 
twentieth century demonstrates the social implications of environmental discourse. The city 
government “eulogized its waterscapes and natural fertility” in order to attract visitors and 
migrants from the Midwest and South, just as Díaz did with Mexico City and artists and authors 
                                                 
14
 Claudia Agostoni, Monuments of Progress: Modernization and Public Health in Mexico City, 1876-1910 (Calgary: University 
of Calgary Press, Boulder: University Press of Colorado, and Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2003), 
115.
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did for La Viga.15 Similarly, as my thesis will show, the Gran Canal and the Canal de la Viga 
represented the same cutting-edge state formation and modern identity constructions that Los 
Angeles advertised, but were not as honest as their lithographs and press releases portrayed 
them to be. As Davis argues, the state needed to show that these hydrological works not only 
functioned properly, but were the prototypes to be modeled after. 
 The historical case study of Canal de la Viga suggests that even when nature stays the 
same, individuals change their identities and imaginations of nature to keep up with social 
trends. As suggested in a foreword by William Cronon, there is a dialectical relationship 
between people and their environments when one or the other changes.16 The Canal de la Viga 
was a point of contact between people and the environment. The changing ways in which the 
residents of La Viga could “modernize” themselves worked in conjunction with an otherwise 
unchanging environment. Local elites’ beliefs about modernity revolved around using the canal 
as a status symbol. As William Beezley shows in Judas at the Jockey Club and Other Episodes 
of Porfirian Mexico, the two major segments in society, the upper class and the lower class, 
“existed side by side in the cities and countryside” rather than as a split between urban and 
rural.17 My thesis supports Beezley's argument. While the upper class used the canal for leisure 
activities and the lower class used it for practical purposes, the significance is that both classes 
coexisted in the same space, using the same material, but in ways that perpetuated class and 
racial binaries. I would further his argument by suggesting that environment, specifically the 
uses of water, helped to maintain these divisions.
  
 
                                                 
15
 Mike Davis, Ecology of Fear: Los Angles and the Imagination of Disaster (New York: Metropolitan 
Books, 2000), 10. 
16
 William Cronon, “Foreword: Time and the River Flowing,” in Mark Cioc's The Rhine: An Ecobiography, 
1815-2000 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002), x. 
17
 Beezley, Judas at the Jockey Club, 6. 
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Vulnerability Theory in Practice 
 I will be writing an environmental history in order to examine a small time in history that 
had comparatively large consequences on both nature and culture. Donald Worster defines 
environmental history as “the interaction between human cultures and the environment in the 
past.”18 The history of the canals shows the intimate relationship that people, society, and 
environment experienced, expressing itself in two ways explained by Donald Hughes. First, by 
using ecological analysis as a means to root around human history, Hughes explores the 
“changes in human societies as they relate to changes in the natural environment.”19 Second, 
as a means to understand the social implications of environmental history, Hughes is “interested 
in what people think about nature, and how they have expressed those ideas in folk religions, 
popular culture, literature and art.”20 The social implications of environment are at the core of 
understanding the ways that the modern Mexican self was constructed, whereas an ecological 
analysis of human history helps to explain the construction of “environmental vulnerabilities.” 
  
Gregory Simon and Sarah Dooling define vulnerabilities in their book, Cities, Nature, 
and Urban Development: The Politics and Production of Urban Vulnerabilities, in terms of social 
systems: “the degree to which a system (or series of interconnected systems) is susceptible and 
responsive to (either as adaptations or mitigation) the adverse effects of shocks and stresses
.
” 
Vulnerable aspects of a society can also be thought as “systemic and integrated socio-
ecological drivers.” 21  According to the authors, these socio-ecological drivers produce and 
perpetuate environmental vulnerabilities, causing them to accumulate until the social system 
breaks down.  
                                                 
18
 Donald Worster, The Ends of the Earth: Perspectives on Modern Environmental History (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), 289. 
19
 Donald Hughes, An Environmental History of the World: Humankind's Changing Role in the Community 
of Life (London: Routledge, 2001), 4. 
20
 Ibid, 4. 
21
 Sarah Dooling and Gregory Simon, eds. Cities, Nature and Development: The Politics and Production 
of Urban Vulnerabilities (London: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2012), 3. 
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 By using this theory, I assert that the watery environment of Mexico City influenced the 
state to restructure its built environment (by rebuilding canals, wells, and the sewage system) as 
well as society's imaginations of water (as a force to be controlled instead of as a natural 
phenomenon). They did so in order to defend themselves from further destruction caused by 
naturally occurring weather phenomena and the inadequacies of the built environment. Events 
like flooding and disease accrued vulnerabilities in the form of death and failed infrastructure 
that had accumulated for hundreds-of-years. In the case of Mexico City, Díaz believed that the 
use of state-of-the-art technology, engineering, and science could mend his drowning city, 
whereas the case of La Viga, stinking from the rotting waters of the canal, shows how the same 
conditions lent themselves to a social reconstruction of environmental spaces. While the Gran 
Canal actively worked to alleviate the conditions that made the city vulnerable, the social and 
natural environment created by the Canal de la Viga perpetuated class-, gender-, and race-
based stereotypes. 
 
Chapter Outline 
 This thesis is divided into three chapters and concludes with an epilogue. Chapter one, 
“Waterlogged States,” backgrounds a large amount of time in the history of the Valley of Mexico, 
beginning with the geological creation of the Valley 25 million years ago and the first 
appearance of humans some 12,000 years in the past. From the very start, it was evident that 
the people who settled into the Valley of Mexico did so for a single reason: the availability of 
water initially made agriculture and hunting more manageable. But as time progressed, the 
relationship that tribes had with water became tedious and water management plans were 
necessary in order for the first humans to fully develop their societies and survive.  
 From ancient civilizations, to the colonial era, and up through independence until 1876, a 
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common thread shows how flooding, waste waters, and drought in the Valley threatened each 
civilization. The environment sometimes was the cause of a society's collapse, as in 
Teotihuacán, and other times it offered legitimacy to a leader's right to rule, as in Moctezuma's 
devotion to create a city-saving dike. Regardless, water management, among other factors, 
often deterred state formation in the Valley of Mexico, giving context to the situation which 
Porfirio Díaz confronted as he came into his presidency nearly 1000 years after major water 
management plans had begun in the Valley of Mexico. Starting in 1876, ideas about water 
changed, as liberal scientific and philosophical thought developed in dialogue with the 
environment. 
 The second chapter, “The Ebb and Flow of Environmental Relationships,” examines the 
ways in which ideas about the environment in the Valley changed in conjunction with Porfirio 
Díaz's 35-year dictatorship. Through the hydrological work of the Gran Canal, Mexico 
experienced new stage of state building that stressed the rearranging of Mexicans’ relationships 
to their aqueous environment. This chapter will answer two questions: first, how did the 
population experience the ebbs, or vulnerabilities, of the environment, and second, how did 
related social and political relationships change as the Porfiriato progressed?  
 Ultimately, it was through the literature produced by the state that Porfirians asserted 
their capability to be modern in the eyes of the modernizing world. Technical writings that 
explained the Gran Canal to engineers, politicians, and investors were published throughout the 
Gran Canal's construction and disseminated to the rest of the world. The major text used in this 
chapter, the mammoth Memoria histórica, técnica y administrativa de las obras del desagüe del 
Valle de México, 1449-1900, acted as the state's apple orchard, and state-published pamphlets 
were picked from portions of its pages. The American Civil Engineers in 1907 and the members 
at the Pan-American conference in 1901 received pamphlets that were compromised of 
12 
 
sections nearly verbatim to the Memoria, but that were different in key respects.22 The two 
publications had significantly different audiences. The first used information that would be 
appealing to engineers, while the second was written to engage the states- and businessmen at 
the conference. They are similar, though, in that both publications chose to describe Mexico as 
a country that still needed modernizing projects, appealing to the problem-solving minds of 
engineers, as well as the pocketbooks from the foreign countries' representatives. By 
recognizing and acknowledging these differences, Porfirians described the Mexican state in 
such a way that made it more appealing to modern societies like those of Great Britain, the 
United States, and France. 
 The final chapter, “The Canal de la Viga and Mexican Modernity,” analyzes the often 
complex relationship that different people had with built and natural environments. Located in a 
small neighborhood just outside of Mexico City, La Viga offered a space of both built and natural 
environments that people interacted with and occupied: the Canal and Paseo de la Viga were 
the built environments which elite Mexican and foreigners used to experience a romantic 
Mexico, whereas the natural elements, such as the water and fish in the canal, belonged to the 
la Viga natives to use for their benefit. This chapter draws on the William Beezley's Judas at the 
Jockey Club, which he argues that both upper and lower class people occupied the same space 
in Mexico, but that a “natural” division of class was practiced. La Viga is emblematic of such a 
division in terms of how people used the environment: los ricos used the waters in leisure, 
whereas los pobres used it for necessity. 
 A rich pool of sources comes from La Viga: foreign and Mexican elites under what 
Beezley calls the “Porfirian Persuasion,” (a culture similar to Victorian and belle époque culture 
abroad) published their travel journals, wrote short stories and poems, and made paintings and 
                                                 
22
 Junta's, Memoria histórica, técnica y administrativa de las obras del desagüe del Valle de México, 
1449-1900 1-3; Brief Sketch of the Drainage of the Valley of Mexico, written expressively for the 
delegates of the Pan-American Congress (Mexico City: Tipografía de Francisco Díaz de Leon, 1901); 
Drainage Works in the Valley of Mexico, Information Written for the Members of “American Civil 
Engineers” (Mexico City: Tipografia de la Direccion General de Telegrafos, 1907). 
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photographs of the canal and the inhabitants. These sources create a romantic image of La 
Viga that was beautiful, clean, and steeped in tradition. Contesting this image, though, were 
another set of Porfirians, ones who adhered to sanitation, hygiene, and policy, and who saw La 
Viga as a place that threatened public health. These two, seemingly separate, groups of elite 
Porfirians can be seen throughout Mexico in the final decade of the Porfiriato, but La Viga 
proves to be a particularly fruitful case study to see this. While socialite-Porfirians perpetuated 
the racial stereotype that contended that poor Mexicans were backwards Indians, through 
cultural and social practices, policy-Porfirians adhered to cutting-edge scientific discoveries to 
maintain the status quo. Socialite-Porfirians enjoyed that Canal de la Viga because it was an 
environment that reinforced their dominant social ranking over the Vigans. Meanwhile, the 
policy-Porfirians saw too much of traditional Mexico in the chaotic landscape, and it would be 
through their research and conclusions that the state ultimately shut down the Victorian 
playground in the 1930s. 
 While the Canal de la Viga was torn down, The Gran Canal failed as a modernizing 
project in a different way, as the Epilogue will show. The Gran Canal failed to drain the Valley of 
Mexico, and instead made the city even more vulnerable to earthquakes, landslides, sinking, 
and other health hazards. The Mexican state has yet to find a suitable form of water 
management that provides enough fresh water and waste management for everyone in the city, 
but also one that does not pollute the surrounding environment. This water crisis in Mexico is far 
from being a surprise or even a new development in the Valley's history. As this thesis will show, 
people living in the Valley of Mexico continued to have a contested relationship with their 
environment and water since they began to create settled societies. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
WATERLOGGED STATES 
 
 This chapter provides a broad background of how the different empires and states in the 
Valley of Mexico attempted to manage their environment to their benefit. Following chronological 
order, the first two sections look at the geological construction of the Valley and how the first 
humans built a relationship with the water surrounding them. Compared to the rest of the world, 
the early populations in Mesoamerica took longer to shift from nomadic lifestyles to sedentary 
ones because of the abundance of wildlife that the Basin had to offer. Once tribes did settle 
down, though, the Valley of Mexico became one of the world’s major hotbeds of communities, in 
large measure because the large amount of water available on which people could rely. As 
populations grew, the relationship that they shared with their environment grew more precarious 
as they relied ever more on the watershed for survival.  
The third section examines the first great civilization in the Valley of Mexico, that of the 
Teotihuacanos in100BCE. By using tree-ring and stalagmite data from around the area, 
researchers have shown that the ancient societies’ cultural development often hinged on the 
state of water in the Valley. The presence of too much water, probably resulting in floods, death, 
and crop destruction, created tension within the Teotihuacán Empire that became difficult to 
manage. These tensions might have led the leaders of this empire to create more honorific 
buildings and tributes in order to please the storm god, Tlaloc, which in part led to considerable 
environmental damage from over-logging the area. The lack of trees and roots to hold the 
ground together would have created an environment even more vulnerable to flooding, leaving 
some historians to conclude that irreparable environmental damage led to the downfall of the 
Teotihuacán Empire.23 
Although defeated by their environment, the Teotihuacanos initiated a system of 
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agriculture that a proceeding civilization would take full advantage of, and use to their benefit. 
The Aztecs, who were a combination of Nahua-speaking tribes in the Valley of Mexico in the 
mid-1400sCE, became masters of the chinampa (commonly known as the “floating gardens”) 
system. Their understanding of the waters in the Basin of Mexico allowed them to create dams 
and dikes that separated the briny water from the fresh, as well as to attempt to protect 
themselves from flooding. This section looks at the Aztecs’ successes with the environment, but 
it is important to point out that the chinampas did not allow them to take full control of the water. 
Instead, the Aztecs lived in an unreliable balance with their environment. Several trial and error 
attempts to manage the Valley’s waters resulted in famines from destroyed crops, out-migration, 
revolts, and further deforestation. As well, the construction and maintenance of the chinampas 
required a large amount of manpower, a resource that they obtained through war. The 
excessive violence and battling initiated by the Aztecs was one of the reasons that the invading 
Spanish found allies so easily in the 1520s.24 
Colonial Mexico saw a drastic change in environmental management. Distrusting 
“Indian” knowledge and experience with water, the Spanish deconstructed the indigenous 
canals, dikes, and dams and erected paved streets in their place. Soon, floods became 
catastrophic, dissuading people from the Spanish metropolis from immigrating to the New 
World. In order to create a desirable locale for Spaniards to move to permanently, something 
had to be done about the lakes. The colonial government was the first to consider draining the 
lakes in the Valley as opposed to coexisting with and managing them, but it was not until the 
late 1700s that any kind of sizable draining would occur. 
 The years 1820 to 1876 conclude this chapter, as the newly independent Mexico dealt 
with politics, economy, and the opening of the world market in addition to the vulnerability of 
their capital city. Since the Aztec flood of 1449, a trend became prevalent in the management of 
water in the Valley of Mexico: only after a harsh flood occurred did the state summon up the 
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funds to attempt to control the water. This was especially true during this 56-year period, since 
Mexico City did not experience any major flooding until 1856. The government responded with a 
competition for engineers and architects to propose plans that would permanently drain the 
Valley. Then a decade of dry weather with mild rains, in combination with significant foreign and 
domestic political crises, put the project off until a particularly wet summer in 1865 revitalized 
the plans. The sudden, albeit less than unpredictable, threat of inundation always seemed to 
kick-start plans that were long forgotten. The second chapter will take a closer look at this 
theory of immediate vulnerability and dormant vulnerability, but for now, a 25-million year 
background is needed. 
 
A Valley Is Born 
10-.6 million years ago 
 
 The Basin of Mexico occupies about 9600km2 of space in the country now known as 
Mexico. In the Cretaceous era (110-65 million years ago), the same area used to be under 
water as part of a shallow sea, but volcanic activity during the Eocene era (65-45 million years 
ago) created the landscape that would someday become home to the third most populous city in 
the world.25 It was at the end of the Eocene, though, that the Basin of Mexico began to take its 
shape. The Basin formed within 25 million years with most of it culminating in the last three 
phases. First, the Sierra de las Cruces, which compromises the western limits of the Basin were 
born, as well as the basement of the Sierra Nevada (the common name of the Trans-Mexican 
Volcanic Belt), beginning the construction of the eastern limits.  
In a matter of nine million years, the Trans-Mexican Volcanic Belt forced the central and 
western sections of the North American continent to spread, thus resulting in the finished 
formation of the Sierra Nevadas, including the now-iconic Popocatépetl and Iztaccihuatl 
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volcanoes. The Ajusco Mountains finished forming within the last million years, which effectively 
blocked the Valley  water’s egress to runoff currents that would lead it away to the Pacific 
Ocean. Once the alluvial plane was shut off by the Ajuscos, sediment could accumulate more 
rapidly and raise the landscape, creating lakes that occupied about 1500km2 with a watershed 
that covered 7000km2 (Pre-Aztec estimates).26 
Once the water levels dropped, five lakes emerged that were connected from North to 
South: Zumpango, Xaltocan, Texcoco/Lago de Mexico, Xochilmilco, and Chalco. For the most 
part, each lake had its own water supply either from mountain springs, river, rain water 
collection, snow melt, or run off that they then shared between tributaries. Lake Texcoco was 
separate from this pool of collection methods: being the southern-most lake, it was not close 
enough to the mountains to receive their runoff waters. Instead Texcoco remained the 
shallowest lake, nearly lagoon-like, that filled with rain water and the runoff from the rest of the 
lakes. In addition to being the shallowest, the waters in Texcoco had no other lake to flow into, 
making evaporation the only way for water to leave the lake. As a result, sediments that were 
soluble in the evaporation process were left behind, mainly those with high salinity; therefore, 
this process of water evaporation-salt crystallization resulted in Texcoco having the briniest 
water in the Basin, while the other four lakes were fresh water.27 
 
The First Humans 
12,000 years ago 
 
 The arrival of humans in the Valley of Mexico has no agreed-upon date, but it is 
generally accepted by ethnologists, geologists, and geographers that people migrated via the 
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Bering Strait in the northern region of the Americas between 30,000 and 50,000 years ago, and 
reached the tip of South America 8,000-12,000 years ago.28 The oldest agricultural site found in 
the Valley of Mexico is some 12,000 years old and was found at the edge of Lake Chalco, in the 
south east corner of the contemporary Mexico capital. The Valley of Mexico was an ideal space 
for early people to voyage to and remain because of its mild temperatures, large and plentiful 
game, as well as the vast amount of water sources. 
 Setting up permanent villages around lakes was beneficial for the early tribes for a 
number of reasons. First, the presence of water sustained the large populations of animals 
located in the area. Besides housing aquatic life, the lakes in the Valley of Mexico were the life 
source for other animals, such as the mammoth. The Valley is known for the largest kill sites of 
mammoths in all of Mesoamerica, begging the conclusion that the Valley was an ideal place for 
larger mammals as well. In fact, the largest number of kills took place around the banks of Lake 
Texcoco, according the number of mammoth fossils found in the area.29  
 Once the landed animal supply began to run low, the reliable source of water also meant 
that keeping and maintaining crops was easier than it was before, resulting in the phase out of 
hunter-gatherer tribes to growing communities that relied on agriculture. The placements of 
these communities was vitally important: if the village was in an area too elevated, then the 
amount of animals was even more scarce and water was harder to come by, but if it were too 
low, their crops would be susceptible to flooding and ruin during the rainy seasons. Large 
populations bloomed into cities, creating a total population of around 150,000 around 100 CE. 
The oldest of these cities, Tlatilco, emerged from the shores of Lake Texcoco in the north and 
became one of the major chiefdoms in the area. The second was Cuicuilco in the southwest, 
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which boasted the highest population and cultural productions of the age.30 Cuicuilco had the 
richest supply of water from Xochilmilco Lake as well as the alluvial flooding from the Ajusco 
Mountains, causing the population to grow and flourish from the abundant source of aquatic 
animal protein and the finest soil for growing crops. Unfortunately, Cuicuilco's glory ended 
abruptly with the Xitle volcanic eruption, sending whatever population remained in the 
surrounding areas north to Tlaltilco. 
 
The Rise and Fall of Teotihuacán 
100BCE-700CE 
 
 Teotihuacán was situated in the northeast of the basin and had a population of about 
30,000 around the time of the Xitle explosion. Five centuries later, the population was 150,000, 
making Teotihuacán one of the largest cities in the world at the time. One hundred years later, 
though, the behemoth collapsed to about 10,000 residents for reasons unknown. Archeologists 
know that a fire started in the city's heart around 550CE with considerable material damage 
around the fire's horizon, indicating that rebellion and dissent were common. Bad administration 
of economy and politics may have also been a factor, as indicated by the fear tactics that the 
Teotihuacanos used during their massive sacrifice ceremonies. Nomadic incursions and social 
problems have also been suggested as reasons for Teotihuacán's collapse, along with 
considerable environmental and climatic change.31 While the answer to the Teotihuacán's fall 
lies in a combination of these causes, this work focuses specifically on the factors that made the 
society vulnerable due to environmental and climatic changes, since these had lasting impacts 
not only on the Teotihuacanos, but on the Aztecs, the Spaniards, and the Mexicans to come.  
 The Teotihuacanos were the first to implement the chinampa system as a way to work 
cohesively with their swampy environment. The chinampas were plots of rectangular land that 
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were incredibly arable for agriculture since they were constructed in the middle of the lake beds 
and drew nutrients directly from the water. They ranged from small plots for personal use, to 
massive 300ft x 30ft farms.32 In addition to the “floating gardens,” as they would come to be 
known by foreigners, waterways were included in the chinampa system that allowed for canoe 
traffic between plots, farms, and cities. Not only were the chinampas crucial for food crops, but 
they were important to the Teotihuacanos for the movement of lumber from around the basin to 
the city center, where they built honorific pyramids to their deities.  
 The Sun Pyramid, erected originally in 175 CE in the main city Ciudadela, remains the 
third largest pyramid in the world and the second largest in Mesoamerica, standing at 225m 
across and 246m high.33 A building of this size, in addition to the pyramids surrounding it, the 
paved streets leading up to it, the stone apartment complexes built nearby to stay close to the 
pilgrimage sight, would have taken a generous amount of the natural resources found around 
the basin.34 That this was the case is evidenced by the fact that even today, the area around 
Ciudadela and Lake Texcoco remains completely stripped of natural woody plants.35 One 
environmental theory for the ancient city's decline was the complete deforestation in the area. 
Once trees disappeared, the ground became less rigid from the tree roots and vegetation, 
causing topsoil and gardens to wash away during the rainy season, resulting in over-
sedimentation of aquatic life's habitats, and bringing higher risks of drought during the dry 
season. 
 Another theory, proposed by geoscientist Matthew Lachniet, suggests that climate and 
cultural change are intricately linked and that drastic changes in climate can result in total 
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societal collapses.36 Using cultural information about the Teotihuacanos, Lachniet concluded 
that, since the society relied on spring and lake water sources, “that could have resulted in 
human susceptibility to drought.” After conducting an experiment by analyzing oxygen isotopes 
in stalagmites found in caves around Ciudadela, Lachniet discovered that there was a single 
and great drought that spanned from 690CE to 870CE, peaking in 770CE. “Climatic drying and 
water-table lowering,” Lachniet wrote, “may have resulted in double peril for Teotihuacán by 
decreasing spring discharge for irrigate and rainfall capture for domestic consumption.”37 During 
the “Big Fire” of 550, effigies of the Storm God, Tlaloc were one of the more conspicuous 
smashed statues around the outskirts of the fire, suggesting that the Teotihuacanos may have 
felt abandoned by their deity during the drought.38 
 
The Waters of the Aztec Empire 
800CE-1500CE 
 
 After Teotihuacán fell, a power vacuum emerged in the Valley of Mexico that a tribe 
named the Toltecs seized. For two hundred years, the Toltecs took advantage of the lack of 
political organization to create their own empire in the Tula Valley east of Teotihuacán, 
spreading a culture that was very similar to the Teotihuacanos. During this time, the population 
in the Valley of Mexico grew to 125,000 people, suggesting that tribes grew or immigrated into 
the Valley.39 The Toltecs were centered in the Tula Valley, where they perpetuated the cultural 
and social achievements of the Teotihuacanos and gained control of more cities. Their empire 
grew too large to sustain, though, and after a decade of drought in 1150, coupled with dissent 
brought about by their harsh rule, the Toltec's power declined.  
 The 12th century was a violent one for the tribes in the Valley of Mexico, eventually 
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resulting in the demise of the Toltecs and the rise of several warring groups. In the 15th century, 
three city-states would commit themselves into a triple alliance: Texcoco, Tlacopan, and 
Tenochtitlan formed the group that today is known as the Aztecs. Around 1430, the Aztec 
Empire took control of the Valley of Mexico, with Tenochtitlan at its center. By this time, the 
construction of waterways throughout the Valley had reached an all-time high as culture after 
culture continued to build on the Teotihuacanos' chinampas, creating the most productive 
agricultural system in Latin America (although the Amazons, Incas, and Mayans used 
chinampa-like systems, the Aztecs had perfected their system by recycling as much waste as 
possible to work in conjunction with the natural fertility of the Valley).40 There were 95 known 
water control mechanisms, 50km of dikes, waterways, and aqueducts, and an unknown—but 
sizable—amount of space dedicated to chinampas for personal and city use. Because of this 
manipulation of nature, the Valley of Mexico was one of the world's most densely populated 
places, owing its demographic boom to this environment.41 
 The field of pre-Hispanic hydrology is woefully undeveloped in the historical record, and 
is, unfortunately, covered mainly from a Spanish point of view. Despite these limitations, 
historian Shawn Miller uses a close reading of the Spanish sources to debunk a myth that 
surrounds the pre-Hispanic cultures in Latin America: the Pristine Myth.42 This myth propounds 
that the first peoples in Latin America were so connected and full of respect for their 
environment that they did not damage it or make any dramatic environmental changes. We 
know this to be misleading, as the evidence already presented indicates. Depleting landed-
mammal food source 12,000 years ago led to the dependence on aquatic protein sources, 
which inspired the Teotihuacanos to build their gardens to manage agricultural and aquatic life. 
Due to their successful agricultural system, their population and city grew, which resulted in the 
depletion of their woodlands. In turn, the absence of roots to hold the soil down changed the 
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construction of the ground in the Valley, making floods more common and less preventable. 
 The Aztecs relied on the chinampas for water management and for agriculture. Any other 
uses were considered as secondary, such as protection from invading people and transportation 
around the canals surrounding the chinampas. Flooding, naturally, was a problem for the 
chinampas, since prolonged periods of being underwater would utterly destroy the crops. 
Drought was another issue, but was more manageable. Crops were located close to canals so 
that during dry seasons, farmers could dig irrigation channels from the canals to their fields. One 
reason for the intricacy of the large amount of waterways, though, was to avoid salinization of 
the chinampas.43 The only way that water left the Basin was through evaporation, leaving 
behind sediments like salt in the water. Over the years, the societies of the Valley had 
constructed enough dikes, ravines, and canals to channel the salty and flood waters away from 
their crops, while constructing separate waterways and aqueducts to lead fresh water into the 
fields.  
 When crops failed, people starved. The Valley’s societies were vulnerable to famine and 
disease. Out-migration and death tolls rose, as did the human sacrifice rates as the Aztecs 
prayed to Tlaloc, the borrowed rain god of the Teotihuacanos. Controlling the water levels and 
their chemistry was a high priority for the Aztecs, who were in a continuous battle to maintain 
their power in the Valley. The environment played a role in this struggle. The research 
performed by Matthew Lachniet reveals a long-standing and deep connection between weather 
patterns, specifically the wetness and dryness of an environment, and cultural advances in a 
society. By analyzing the oxygen isotopes in a stalagmite found in the cave found directly under 
the Teotihuacanos' Sun Pyramid, Lachniet was able to determine exactly how wet or dry each 
year was; from this, he built a timeline that allowed him to map the cultural timeline of the Valley 
of Mexico against the area’s wettest and driest conditions.  
 This data revealed that the Valley experienced periodic droughts, and correspondingly 
                                                 
43
 Ibid, 21. 
24 
 
developed cultural commonalities that emphasized the importance of water and water 
management. One notable correlation came in 1449, the year in which the construction of the 
largest dike in Tenochtitlan coincided with the wettest conditions revealed by the oxygen 
isotopes in the stalagmite.44 Lachniet’s research shows that it was no coincidence that Aztec 
Emperor felt pressure to alleviate his capital city's vulnerability to flooding, because he was, in 
fact, ruling during an epoch prone to excessive rain. Indeed, according to Lachniet's findings, 
rainfall levels rose after Tula declined, leading us to believe that the from the time of their arrival 
in the Valley, the Aztecs were submerged in hydrological necessities. While it seems as if the 
Aztecs had the greatest understanding of how best to manage the lakes’ water levels, the 
argument still stands that water management was a challenge to the state during times of flood 
or drought. Their ability to separate the brackish water from the fresh, to route waters with 
canals and dikes, as well as to use water resources for transportation were all impressive feats 
for an ancient culture, but their population still relied on the basic control of this aspect of nature. 
When the lakes overflowed into the city, the emperor’s ability to communicate with the gods was 
questioned and his regime was threatened. 
Such a situation presented itself when a particularly large flood inundated Tenochtitlan in 
1449. Friar Juan de Torquemada, a Spanish friar, missionary, and historian in the New World, 
collected stories and conducted interviews to reconstruct the 1449 flood nearly a century after 
the event. So great was the flood that the entire city was inundated and people could only move 
around the city by boat or canoe. Several hundred people drowned and an innumerable number 
suffered from crop damage.45 The Aztec emperor, Moctezuma, received counsel from local 
engineers, who suggested the construction of an enormous dike 16.7km outside the city. The 
Nezahuatcoyotl dike was named after that successful poet-engineer and lord of the city of 
Texcoco, and Torquemada added that, “with [the construction of the dike completed] the city 
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was secured, because it broke the blows of the brackish waters and prevented these from 
mixing with the fresh water on which the city was founded.”46 Not only did Nezahuatcoyotl’s 
structure help to prevent more floods from destroying the city and disrupting Aztec life, but he 
crafted it in such a way that would keep the over-sedimented and salty waters of Texcoco from 
entering into the chinampa fields and killing the crops. The dike was a major success and spoke 
to the vast understanding that the Aztecs had of their environment and the most effective ways 
to manage it before it could completely destroy them. 
 
Colonial Mexico 
1521-1820 
 
 A tertiary benefit of the Aztec waterway system was that it offered the capital a defense 
against invaders. The ability to escape on foot as well as to have easy access to supplies or 
reinforcements was not easily managed when the city of Tenochtitlan was in the middle of the 
lake. The Spanish intended to march on the capital and take it by force, but when they 
descended the mountain slopes from sacking Cholula in 1519, they realized that marching 
would no longer be possible. Upon seeing Tenochtitlan for the first time, conquistador Bernal 
Díaz wrote that, “when we saw so many cities and villages built in the water and other great 
towns on dry land and that straight and level causeway going towards Mexico, we were 
amazed...on account of the great towers and cues and buildings rising from the water, all built of 
masonry. And some of our soldiers even asked whether the things that we saw were not a 
dream.”47 The Spanish conquistador Hernán Cortés met with the Aztecan emperor Moctezuma 
on one of those causeways, while hundreds of people paddled their canoes through the water to 
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observe the meeting.48 
 The Aztec Empire fell two years later, and with the last major stronghold defeated, the 
Spanish established the capital of their own empire where Tenochtitlan once stood. Having 
sufficiently conquered the human population of Mexico, the Spaniards in the capital then turned 
to the environment. The lakes were a burden to them, as Europeans had evolved from 
depending on human labor to human and animal labor; canoes were considered a downgrade 
when the Spanish relied on horses as their main source of transportation. The Spanish 
immediately started filling in the ancient canals and chinampas in order to elevate the ground 
and create roads. Unfortunately, raising the ground to meet Spanish feet hampered the surface 
drainage of the city which the Aztecs had worked diligently to protect. In addition to filling in 
canals, the Spanish proceeded to take down dikes, including the important Nezahuatcoyotl dike. 
The structure had already received considerable damage during the siege of the city since the 
Spanish cut holes into it in order to move in and out via canoe. The dike was also made of 
precious lumber and stone that the Spanish needed in order to rebuild and fortify New Spain. 
The lumber in the water structures became priceless because of the excessive logging that the 
Spaniards performed all around the valley, causing them to be even more vulnerable to 
environmental disaster because of an increase in surface runoff and silting during the rainy 
season.49 
 Major flooding began in the city in 1553, followed by floods in 1580, 1604, and again in 
1629. Instead of turning to the Aztecan knowledge of the environment, a knowledge that had 
been accumulated after hundreds of years of their predecessors’ trials with water management, 
the Spanish preferred the methods of what was familiar: they turned to Dutch models of 
environmental control.50 In 1608, the first serious attempt to drain the flood waters that 
inundated the city was completed; El Tajo de Nochistongo attempted to drain Lake Zumpango 
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with a 15km long open canal that ended in the Tula Valley. This project took four years to 
complete, and it affected more than just the hopeful residents of an inundated Mexico City: 
close to 130,000 indios trabajadores (Indian workers) came from all over the Basin of Mexico to 
work on the desagüe, including some 3,500 women who saw that the workers were fed and 
housed.51 In all, the project cost the colonial government 413,324 pesos.52 
 To the embarrassment to the officials, el Tajo de Nochistongo did not prevent future 
floods, and other, greater hydrological projects emerged. The Spanish—ironically in this case 
following theories held by the Aztecs—believed that there was a natural drain in the Basin of 
Mexico. The trick was only to find it, discover why it ceased to lead the waters out, and to fix it. 
After the failures of Nochistongo, they concluded that the drain was not in Lake Zumpango, and 
after the flood of 1629, the viceroy of New Spain needed to find faster solutions. As Mexico City 
sat underwater for about five years, the population dwindled from 20,000 Spanish residents to a 
mere 400, who had learned to use canoes much the way that their former Aztecan enemies 
had.53 Mexico City had a year’s rest from flooding when the deluge returned in 1635, this time 
taking 30,000 Indian lives either as a direct result from the flood or the resulting famine and 
disease.54 
 Instead of trying to find another sinkhole in another part of the Basin, the officials and 
scientists in New Spain agreed in the late 1630s that the new drainage project, el Canal de 
Huehuetoca, would drain the flood waters, as opposed to preventing them entirely. The open 
canal would act as a quick fix, temporary for as long as it took the Spaniards to find the 
nonexistent drain and mend it. An additional 5,000 Indians were employed for this job that lasted 
for two years, costing 885,000 pesos.55 
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 Given the Spaniards’ failures to find a drain, drastic changes to the transportation 
infrastructure of the Valley were delayed. Even though some of the ancient canals were 
transformed into roads, transportation by canoe remained popular among the masses. The 
canals offered quick and cheap routes in and out of the city, and connected the villages around 
the lakes with the capital in more efficient ways than roads could. In addition, the chinampas 
outside of Mexico City remained functioning and provided the colonists with produce; instead of 
buying a horse and cart, the horse being one more mouth to feed, the farmers could rent or take 
their own rafts across the lakes and through the canals with their merchandise and go directly 
into the city. Traveling via waterway was so popular that the Spanish government implemented 
a tax system in order to keep records of the traffic and goods that went in and out of the city. 
The farmers had to pay taxes on what they brought into the city and pay to dock their rafts to 
sell their merchandise, similar to the system used for boats that docked at harbors after sailing 
across the sea.56 
 For the next 150 years, the Mexican viceroy tried, again and again, either to drain the 
Valley or to minimize the damage from flooding with both small and large hydrological projects. 
It was not until el Canal de Huehuetoca connected to another project in 1796 that the water-
table in the Valley of Mexico began to drop noticeably. At last, it seemed like the lacustrine 
environment would finally disappear and give peace to the colonists.  
 
 
Inundated Independent Mexico 
1820-1876 
 
 Upon winning their independence from Spain, a privileged, elitist, and liberal core of 
Mexicans took up where their former government left off with the desagüe of the Valley of 
Mexico: planning to do nothing until the city was inundated. This is not to say that the newly 
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formed Mexican government was not busy. Coups and counter-coups plagued the 1820s, and 
then problems in northern Mexico during the 1830s led to the annexation of Texas in 1836, 
leaving the state scrambling to maintain control of the North. The 1840s are marked with issues 
between the United States and Mexico, culminating in the Mexican-American War from 1846-
1848. Mexico lost its northern territories (modern day California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, New 
Mexico, Kansas, Colorado, Wyoming, Oklahoma, and New Mexico), and emerged from the 
conflict owing millions of dollars in debt.57 
 Coming up for air from the crisis in 1856, the Ministry of Development held an open 
competition for Mexicans to participate in: propose a manageable construction plan that could 
successfully drain the Valley of Mexico, and see themselves become the head engineer of their 
project. The winner was Francisco de Garay, a Mexican man who had studied architecture in 
France. He proposed that a great canal be built between Lake Texcoco and the beginning of the 
tunnel that was part of el Tajo de Nochistongo. The government might have undertaken this 
project, but unfortunately, the State experienced more internal problems. A civil war erupted 
from 1857-1861 ending with a liberal win, only to be defeated by the French invasion of 1861. 
Mexico came under a Mexican-French monarchy led by the Austrian duke, Emperor Maximilian 
I. It was not until 1865 that the Emperor saw that Garay begin his project.58 
 For the first time, Mexico would use machinery to help aid the construction process. As 
opposed to hands, shovels, and baskets, the workers now had “an excavator to work in the 
trenches; some locomobiles [small, steam-powered carts that ran on tracks] for drains and for 
extraction in the shafts; a special stationary machine for drains, and some dredges for the 
clearing or excavation of lakes or canals,” all of which came straight from Europe.59 The work 
would consist of a canal that would be 30.5km in length and a 10km-long tunnel, and would rely 
on older desagüe projects to lead the lake and flood waters to the Tula valley that same way 
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that the Huehuetoca Canal proposed to do. With a team of Mexican and European engineers 
alike, Garay broke ground in 1865. After eight months, shafts for the tunnel were sunk and 
70,000m3 of earth were extracted from the trench leading to the Tula valley.60 
 Sadly, Garay did not get enough done to impress the Emperor. After domestic and 
foreign pressures, the project halted in 1866. After a few weeks’ delay, work resumed under the 
direction of Garay’s replacement, engineer Miguel Iglesias. Little more had been completed 
during the rest of the Emperor Maximilian's reign, when Benito Juárez, liberal winner of the civil 
war, ousted the Mexican-French monarchy to restore his liberal republic.61 Convinced by the 
Ministry of Development that the work was of the utmost importance, Juárez set funding aside 
to continue Garay's desagüe under yet another head engineer but again, Mexican politics got in 
the way and the work slowed to a cease in 1869. Juárez died in 1871 and his successor did not 
accept the Ministry of Development's reports regarding the desagüe of the Valley, leaving the 
project dead in its tracks until the flood of 1877. Porfirio Díaz was in office at the time of the 
flood and saw an opportunity to prove himself to his country as well as to the rest of the 
modernizing world. 
 
Conclusion 
 Even though the consequences of flooding in the Valley of Mexico had decreased 
significantly by the late nineteenth-century, the number of people affected by it had increased. 
People in the city who experienced the deluge in their streets and walkways during the summer 
storms could not contact their friends and families outside the Valley by using canoes as their 
predecessors had done. The government's reputation of being unable to protect its capital city 
from flooding followed it from centuries prior. The late nineteenth-century, though, had 
something in store for the rebellious environment that in ages past had since deterred state 
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formation: contemporary engineers would be offered a chance that allowed for them to construct 
a hydrological project without interruption and with full financial support. 
 The next chapter will examine this time in Mexico, known as the Porfiriato, when the 
state took its most aggressive action against the watery environment of its capital city. Taking 
advantage of peace time and foreign interest in Mexican land and economics, Porfirio Díaz and 
his advisers constructed the greatest and most extensive draining project that the Valley had yet 
seen in an effort to end the problems that Mexicans had with their environment. In the process 
of taming the waters, Díaz would be able to claim to be what no other leader in the history of the 
Valley had ever been: everlasting master over the environment and bringer of modernity.  
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CHAPTER 2: 
THE EBB AND FLOW OF ENVIRONMENT AND STATE RELATIONSHIPS: 
MEXICO CITY AND THE GRAN CANAL 
 
 By the late 1800s, an ensemble of engineers, doctors, and hygienists from Mexico, 
Europe, and the United States were in Mexico City and the surrounding Valley. The reason for 
their visits: to heal and help the sick people afflicted by, they believed, the shallow lakes that 
inundated their environment during the rainy months of summer and choked them with toxic 
dust in the dry seasons. José María Guyosa was walking around Lago de Texcoco in 1892, 
taking in the scenery, making notes about the sights, smells, and tastes that he encountered. 
His description of the water as “black and greenish foul-smelling mud,” summarizes his 
superficial conclusions about the condition of the lacustrine environment.62 The same 
description could be used to describe so many other dead or decayed things: a pile of garbage, 
the end of a sewage line, or a rotted wound. 
 So terrible was the environment for Guyosa that he experienced painful headaches that 
required him to retreat to his residence, where he continued to suffer. It was publicized incidents 
like Guyosa's that fired Díaz's desire to drain as much of the lakes as he could, just as Guyosa's 
experience fueled him to help Porfirians and Mexicans annihilate the malodorous and marshy 
environment. The Gran Canal began construction in 1879 with the help of research and 
constant observation by men like Guyosa and the other physicians, sanitationists, and public 
health advisers in order to eliminate the threat to Mexicans' health and state development. 
 Where the last chapter explained how water, in part, deterred state formation in the 
Distrito Federal, this chapter will examine how Porfirians used the Gran Canal as the ultimate 
“disciplinary” tool to control a most unruly aspect of the state. Officially completed in 1900, the 
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Canal checked the waters that had plagued the Mexican government for centuries, and the 
state believed that it could finally put to an end the environmental hazards that made so many 
people vulnerable. This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section comments on the 
vulnerable environment that prompted the Mexican government’s decision to build the Gran 
Canal when they did. Gregory Simon and Sarah Dooling suggest in their theory about 
environmental vulnerability that the environment, urban landscapes, and the human population 
in that space share a contentious relationship that, upon analysis, reveals certain social and 
cultural ideas of that population.63 
 The social and cultural ideas that coalesced in the decision to build the Gran Canal were 
conditioned by the intellectual environment seeping into Mexico from more developed Western 
nations. The issues of water control and flood management were ones that people in the Valley 
of Mexico had faced since they first established permanent residence there. The era of 
liberalism, though, saw governments begin to take a more rigid approach to the issues that 
proved to be problematic. Mexico was not the only nation to face problems resulting from urban 
population growth, hygiene and sanitation, and environmental disasters. France, Germany, the 
U.S., and England—among many other countries in Western Europe—created and shared their 
own plans. Mexicans were particularly enthusiastic about England's research on sanitation and 
the belle époque urban architecture erected in France.64 
 The following section of this chapter details the role that Porfirio Díaz played in the 
creation of the canal. Díaz had three reasons to build the Gran Canal: the lake beds would 
provide quality land to sell for agricultural use, sanitation and public health for Mexicans in the 
capital would improve immensely, and the massive structure would act as a symbolic tribute to 
the modern accomplishments of the Porfirian state. The chapter concludes by examining the 
literature published by the state that described the construction process and was used to 
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disseminate information to the rest of the world. A consideration of what Porfirians chose to 
highlight or downplay in these publications makes their purpose clear. Beyond simply wanting to 
share information, Porfirians were interested in stressing just how much Mexico had achieved in 
science, architecture, and engineering. They believed that the completed Gran Canal was one 
of the structures that ranked Mexico among the rest of the world's elite, modern countries. 
 
Environmental Vulnerability Theory 
 The socio-ecological drivers that put people at risk in the environment of the Valley of 
Mexico are multiple: favoring land travel to waterways in an environment dominated by water, 
using an open water system as the city's personal sewage and dump site (some even say that it 
acted as a temporary grave for the Spanish who lacked land to bury corpses65), stripping the 
land of trees and top-soil for city-architecture, and the tendency to react to environmental 
dangers only after catastrophes occurred seem to be the greatest drivers, as well as the most 
conspicuous, through the Valley's human history. Gregory Simon and Sarah Dooling derived 
several critical questions from their theory regarding environmental vulnerability theory, two of 
which I apply to Mexico City. The first asks what it means to be vulnerable. How could the 
people in the Valley of Mexico be vulnerable to their environment? 
 As it was described in the last chapter, Mexico City was in a precarious geographical 
position, causing the centuries old vulnerabilities of flooding, disease, and sewage 
mismanagement to accrue from the start. Governments continually tried to drain and route the 
waters in Mexico City in order to defend themselves from further destruction wrought by the 
natural environment, such as weather phenomena and the geology of the Basin, and the built 
environment of sinking streets, poorly constructed buildings, and poorly maintained canals. 
Their attempts to move water away created an even more unstable environment because the 
city began to sink due to collapses in the water shelf as a consequence of the rapidly shifting 
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and decreasing lake water. Events like flooding, disease, and earthquakes amassed 
vulnerabilities in the form of death and failed infrastructure that accumulated for hundreds of 
years. From 1822-1900, there were about 78 floods in the Distrito Federal and the State of 
Mexico.66 In the case of Mexico City, Díaz believed that the use of state-of-the-art technology, 
engineering, and science could mend his drowning city: the Gran Canal worked to alleviate 
these vulnerabilities. 
 The second question extended by environmental vulnerability theory concerns the 
degree of endangerment and risk to which a society is subject. Is a society encapsulated in a 
vulnerable environment in constant danger, or might it be implied that it exists in an elevated, 
but not imminent, state of risk? The difference between the two conditions is slight, but 
important. Simon and Dooling write, “Experiences of being at risk can intensify as conditions 
change and threats emerge; likewise, experiences of risk can be alleviated by minimizing 
exposure to harm and shifting the risk to a different place or group of people.”67 It is my 
contestation that a society in constant danger is more willing to seek solutions to its vulnerability 
in comparison to a society which experiences an elevated state of risk. I would further argue 
that the Mexican government controlled the state of environmental risk that Mexicans perceived 
in order to fulfill or protect its own agenda. 
 For example, in the year 1864, there were four floods in the Distrito Federal that infected 
homes with flood and sewage waters, and yet, only one newspaper, El Pájaro Verde, described 
the event.68 Records show that the capital city experienced flooding every single day for the 
month of August in 1865.69 Why did the Mexican government, then under the rule of Emperor 
Maximilian, not take action at this time to clean the homes, the streets, and start a new project 
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to keep the city clean? The state did nothing of the sort because it served no purpose to do so: 
the state did not have the means or the technological knowledge and ability to fix the problem of 
constant flooding. Furthermore, these floods were proof that the drainage project at the time, 
Garay's canals which crossed five major lakes, failed due to the radical shifts in government, 
unsupported finances, and lack of technology. The Mexican state was not eager to make itself 
look incompetent by publicizing this information by addressing the floods of 1864. When it was 
suitable, society remained at an elevated state of environmental risk, a condition that was 
familiar to Mexicans who lived at the flood lines. 
 Díaz championed the interpretation of the environment as being in constant and 
imminent endangerment, however. In 1887, a year after 300 homes were destroyed in a two-
day storm, another flood swept through Mexico City, grabbing the attention of two newspapers, 
El Diaro Hogar and El Siglo Diez y Nueve, which listed what businesses were affected and how 
the flood occurred.
70
This event also gave Díaz the opportunity to make an announcement to the 
people of the capital, where he described the terrifying event, characterizing it “as making it 
more difficult to drain the capital.”71 This would not do for Mexico City because Díaz had plans to 
make it an urban center on par with Paris, London, and Chicago, and muddy homes blurred the 
line between city and countryside.72 In order to gain the support of the elites in Mexico, 
Porfirians saw that this story about the flood reached the national press, making headlines in 
more than one of the most popular newspapers. By conducting this publicity campaign, Díaz 
intended to persuade citizens to believe that their capital was beyond a simple “elevated risk,” 
and that their environment threatened to overturn the city with floods, stagnant waters, disease, 
and filth. The natural environment worked in conjunction with the nineteenth-century intellectual 
environment to create the circumstances that allowed for Díaz to change the country's 
imagination of nature and its control. In the next section, I will describe nineteenth-century 
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liberalism that allowed for the shift in understanding nature and politics. 
 
Doused Political Discourse 
 
Water in the nineteenth-century came to symbolize and indicate many things: 
cleanliness, health standards, hygiene, sanitation, and mortality. At first, it was France who led 
the way in experiments that connected water to science and health, but soon the field of public 
health and sanitation grew internationally. For example, in 1884, the famous German doctor 
leading the way in tuberculosis research, Robert Koch, gave a seminar in Berlin about cholera, 
and its distribution via contaminated water. By 1885, versions of his lecture were published and 
used in Mexico.73 As their experiments gained popularity, scientists' and hygienists' publications 
were translated and made available to wider audiences. Another example comes from Sweden: 
a pamphlet from the famous Finnish hygienist, Albert Palmberg, made its debut in the Swedish 
language in 1889, and described the public health standards in Britain, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Austria, Sweden, and Finland. It was published in French in 1891, in Spanish in 1892, 
in English in 1893, and was reprinted in 1895, making Palmberg’s research very accessible to 
interested parties, like those in Mexico City, who were eager to compare and contrast health 
systems that worked and failed.74 
 Scientific thinking that figured into successful health systems increasingly developed 
connections between odor, atmosphere, and impurity. Scientists believed that scent-free, clear 
water resulted in clean and morally aligned people.75 Great Britain’s noted social reformer, 
                                                 
73
 Alejandro Tortolero Villaseñor, “Transforming the Central Mexican Waterscape,” in Christian 
Brannstrom, ed., Territories, Commodities and Knowledges: Latin America Environmental History in 
the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (London: Institute for the Study of the Americas, 2004), 125. 
74
 Heikki Vuorinen, “The Emergence of the Idea of Water-Borne Diseases,” in Petri S. Juuti, Tapio S. 
Katko, and Heikki S. Vuorinen, eds. Environmental History of Water: Global Views on Community 
Water Supply and Sanitation (London: IWA Publishing, 2007), 111. 
75
 The research performed by Pierre Jean George Cabanis began these theories by grounding them in 
experiments and methods in the mid eighteenth century; Honoré de Balzac was an admirer of smells 
and the way that they detect class status, and used it in his La Comédie humanie to make an olfactory 
map of Paris. See Charles-Leonard Pfeiffer, Taste and Smell in Balzac's Novels (Tucson: University of 
Arizona, 1949) and Alain Corbin, The Foul and the Fragrant: Odor and the French Social Imagination 
(Boston: Harvard University Press, 1986) for more information. 
38 
 
Edwin Chadwick, picked up these conclusions in the publication, Report on the Sanitary 
Condition of the Labouring Population of Gt. Britain, completed in 1842. This and the 
subsequent research about the sanitary conditions of urban centers produced by the British 
made them the new leaders of the sanitation movement that wielded the most influence on 
countries like Mexico.76 For Chadwick, there were four conclusions that he drew from his 
research concerning the sanitation of Great Britain's urban centers: 1) that disease was caused 
by “atmospheric impurities produced by decomposing animal and vegetable substance, by 
damp and filth, and close and overcrowded dwellings,” 2) that disease is always present under 
these conditions and can be alleviated by “drainage, proper cleansing, better ventilation, and 
other means of diminishing atmospheric impurity,” 3) that cleanliness relies on the purity of 
water, and 4) that “the primary and most important measures…within the recognized province of 
public administration, are drainage, the removal of all refuse of habitations, streets, and roads, 
and the improvement of the supplies of water.”77 
 The standout development that Chadwick made was to claim that the state was 
responsible for the health of its citizens by providing, in the very least, the removal of the most 
harmful medium of disease: uncontrolled-water. Not only did he connect state formation and the 
control of water, but he also continued to link the moral character of people and their 
environment. For example, he contended that when an urban environment did not have fresh, 
clean water, it tended “to incite the habitual use of ardent spirits,” which resulted in an immoral, 
sick, and degenerate urban class.78 
 This link between the character of a sector of society and its immediate environment 
was not Chadwick's own theory. Wilhelm Riehl's The Natural History of the German People, 
                                                 
76
 It may be deduced that, for this reason, the Junta and Díaz chose a British form to take over the 
construction of the Gran Canal, since Great Britain was, by this time, prolific in its sanitation and 
hygienic infrastructure. Edwin Chadwick, Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population 
of Gt. Britain, ed. Michael Walter Finn (Scotland: Edinburgh University Press, 1965), 422-423. 
77
 Ibid, 422-423. 
78
 Ibid, 197-198. 
39 
 
published in four volumes during the 1840s and 50s, was the first to suggest that the national 
character of a state and its people comes directly from their relationship with their natural 
environment.79 Rhetoric that tied environment to state character, like Riehl's theories, was a 
problem for Díaz since the Mexican environment could be so out of control and destructive. The 
forests of Germany protected and strengthened the German people, just as the seas of Great 
Britain gave the peasants certain sea-worthiness.80 In the meantime, the flood waters of Mexico 
seemed only to represent immorality and contamination. 
 
 
A Maliciously Benevolent Dictator 
 
While some historians strive to discover Porfirio Díaz's true intentions for wanting a 
modern state—be it for his own pride or for the good of Mexico—I argue that Díaz was nothing 
more than the product of his era.81 He embodied the contemporary contradiction: on the one 
hand, he cared deeply about the Mexican people, and by applying European philosophies that 
proposed adherence to social ordering, he hoped to lift his city out of the swamps to create the 
modern and enlightened citizenry. On the other hand, Díaz had massive amounts of profit on 
the line that required Mexicans adherence to the strict hierarchy of the new liberalism which 
resulted in thousands of peones (peons) toiling away on the drainage project or clearing their 
homes to make way for farm land. If we follow the popular human body metaphor proposed by 
the científicos, then some individuals were lucky enough to be the heart or the brain of Mexico 
City, while the rest of Mexican citizens had the mundane job of keeping the city alive. 
 Several Mexicanists agree that the terminus of the Gran Canal was the greatest 
modernizing accomplishment made by Díaz, but most importantly, Díaz himself thought the 
                                                 
79
 Wilhelm Riehl, The Natural History of the German People, translated by David Diephouse (Lewiston: 
The Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), 63. 
80
 Ibid, 47-49. 
81
 Especially in comparison to Benito Juárez, Porfirio Díaz comes out with as a more contested character. 
See Paul Garner's chapter, “The Civilian and the General, 1867-1911,” in William Beezley, ed., A 
Companion to Mexican History and Culture (Marlton: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 288-315. 
40 
 
project would be his crowning glory in Mexico City. After the completion of the canal, “[Díaz] 
considered Mexico City to be the showcase of this regime and the most visible symbol of order 
and progress,” writes Porfirian historian James Garza.82 Controlling the waters in the city was 
an all-time necessity if Díaz was going to show the industrialized world that his country was 
worth taking interest in. Claudia Agostoni, another Mexican historian, writes that “the draining 
and cleansing of the menacing environment and thus the conquest of the water that had 
besieged [the capital] throughout its history, was seen as an essential requirement for its 
prosperity and modernity, and this conquest was also regarded as an indicator of progress and 
civilization.”83 Agostoni and Garza interpreted Díaz's actions as a tool for economic prosperity 
and a way to get one foot into the modern world market. Historians like these see less of the 
benevolent dictator, as Díaz approved uprooting villages, preferred foreign investment over 
local markets, and sold rich lake-bed land to the highest bidder instead of making it available to 
the recently displaced villagers.84 
 Other historians tend to interpret the actions of Díaz as part of a mission to make the 
modern Mexican, who was, first and foremost, healthy. Emily Wakild writes, “By controlling the 
liquid of life in the city and expelling inconvenient run-off, [Díaz] wanted to protect citizens from 
disease and property from destruction.”85 Healthy citizens implied a healthy city as well as a 
robust work force, similar to the healthy forest-peasants of Germany described by Riehl. 
Differing interpretations aside, however, historians cannot separate the state's health reasons 
from the economic opportunities that lake draining offered. The purpose of modernization 
projects was, as Tortorlero Villaseñor wrote: “to expand irrigation as a means to boost 
agricultural productivity and to drain lakes for health and economic reasons.”86 A healthy 
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working class was the backbone of a prosperous economy, and as Tortolero Villaseñor also 
points out, a prosperous economy also had the means to import foreign firms for their 
technological and mechanical superiority. If the modern state was at stake, though, then Díaz 
was sure to bring his country up to the standards set by the industrialized world. 
 
Constructing the Canal, Reinforcing the State 
 
The drainage project had three components: the canal, the tunnel, and the drainage 
ditch. Construction began in 1879 under guidance from the former project head engineer, 
Francisco Garay. He would be replaced in 1884 by científicos, Don Luis Espinosa and Ricardo 
Orozco. The project had three main goals: “first, to stop the floods; second, to receive the dirty 
water and residue from Mexico City and drive them outside of the Valley; and third to control the 
waters in this same Valley, and, when it is necessary, to remove that which can harm it.”87 
Unfortunately, construction ceased from 1880-1884 under a new puppet government controlled 
by Díaz, but picked up again after the flood in 1886 with new vigor and immediacy. Also in 1886 
a governing board was created in order to oversee the project: the Junta Directiva del Desagüe 
del Valle de México (Board of Directors for Draining the Valley of Mexico) consisted of 
científicos who handled contracting, day-to-day affairs, and releasing press announcements. 
Even though científicos were put in charge, Díaz micromanaged the entire project by 
demanding daily reports and any updates or unforeseen issues.88 
 At first, the Junta contracted two American firms, Bucyrus Company and Read and 
Campbell, to run the construction sites. The Mexicans disliked their management and spending, 
but mostly felt that the Americans could not keep to the strict deadline of finishing the project.89 
Flexing its muscles, the Junta dissolved its contracts with the Americans after three years and 
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made a power move over to the British contractor, Pearson & Son, in 1889. The American 
companies, interested in maintaining their reputation, kept some of their engineers on the 
project, with the Junta's approval, who continued to oversee the work and the use of machinery. 
 Pearson & Son was represented by Weetman Pearson, who left a rich archive of letters 
and journal entries between himself and the Vice President of the Junta, José Yves Limantour. 
Historian David Aguirre argues that places in Latin America, like Mexico, were an unofficial part 
of the British Empire during the late nineteenth-century because of the amount of infrastructure 
built by the British and land that they owned for agricultural purposes.90 A close reading of the 
correspondence between Pearson and Limantour about the Gran Canal, however, reveals a 
relationship far more complex than one of simple dominance and subordination. Limantour's 
central task was to attract foreign investment, just as much as it was, as historian Paul Garner 
writes, “to protect Mexico's economic and political sovereignty.”91 This goes directly against 
Aguirre's assertion. The power wielded by Limantour and the Junta is an example of how the 
state perceived itself as a modern entity because of its independence from empires. Limantour 
constantly argued down the prices that Pearson and his representatives suggested for all of 
their projects in Mexico (Pearson was involved in several projects that included the Gran 
Canal). Both Limantour and Pearson respected each other and developed a relationship that 
honored each other’s wishes and financial business, neither was the master of the other. 
 John Body, the chief manager for Pearson & Son in Mexico, kept his own notes about 
what he experienced while working on the drainage project, offering more intimate details than 
the pennies and soils recorded by the Junta. While the actual nationality of the workers has not 
been unearthed, Body labeled them as “Indians” who removed dirt and stone “to a distance of 
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100 feet, in a rough net or basket, each man carrying and digging alternately.”92 Body was 
impressed by the work completed by laborers, writing that “the Indians execute all kinds of 
earthworks very satisfactorily provided care is taken to keep the work at proper time and 
level.”93 The workers were probably a combination of Yaqui Indians from northern Mexico, 
expelled locals, Chinese coolies, and run-of-the-mill laborers in need of work. Enough accidents 
happened at the construction site of the tunnel and canal that a hospital was constructed 
nearby specifically for the men injured on the job.94 Overall, more than 12,000,000m3 of 
Mexican soil was excavated, some 4,800,000m3 coming from the hand-labor. After spending 
money on contractors, excavation equipment, lumber, stone, iron (and other construction 
metals), as well as paying the engineers and the day-laborers, the total cost of the drainage 
project was 15,967,778.17 pesos (approximately US$1,232,899 in today's currency). Pearson 
alone made 7.8million pesos.95 
 Once finished in 1900, the canal covered over 30 miles of Mexican land, starting from 
the barrio of San Lázaro east of Mexico City; the open canal then winds through the Distrito 
Federal, the state of Mexico, then the state of Hidalgo before leading out to the tunnel by the 
Tula Valley. Its greatest width was 6.4m, and its maximum depth was 22m. While most of the 
canal's length was dug out by hand and shovel, dredges were brought in by the English. Díaz 
was so impressed by these magnificent machines, eye-sores though they were, that he had 
them christened like ships leaving for the sea. They were The Carmen, The Lucy, The Conchita, 
and The Annie; the biggest, The Carmen, was named after his publicly admired and beautiful 
wife.96 The entrance to the canal in San Lázaro served as the stage for Díaz's public 
announcement of the project's completion, an affair that boasted national and international 
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guests. Overall, under the leadership of the head engineer Luis Espinosa, the canal had taken 
21 years to be completed. 
 While the canal covered the most land ever used for such a purpose and boasted the 
use of the highly technical English dredges, the tunnel was also an impressive piece of the 
project. It was finished at 3 a.m. on the morning of New Year's Eve, 1894, after nine years of 
construction. Unlike the canal, which incorporated pre-existing irrigation and water paths in its 
design, the 10km-long tunnel was constructed from the ground up during Díaz's reign. No state-
of-the-art technology was used, but the fact that the tunnel could pump water out at a rate of 
18m3/sec using the forces of gravity alone piqued the attention of engineers and urban 
architects alike, while the whole project’s height, size, and length awed the audience during its 
inauguration. 
 
 
A Water-Built State 
 
The Junta kept very close notes about certain aspects of the canal's construction for its 
own records, for its reports to the president, and to keep on hand for later publications. This 
section, focusing on the final use of these notes, argues that publications were an important 
means by which Porfirians expressed their conceptions of modernity. By using these 
publications, the Mexican state could interest an international audience in the Gran Canal, and 
once that was achieved, they could draw attention to the city, the new crop-land, and 
opportunities for more projects. By publicizing the accomplishment of the Gran Canal, Díaz 
believed he could obtain glory for Mexico City and the country. 
 In 1901, the Junta released the massive three-volume history of the drainage system 
titled Memoria histórica, técnica y administrativa de las obras del desagüe del Valle de México. 
The contributing authors, four in all, created five parts in the first volume that described 1) the 
history of the Valley of Mexico from the conquest of the Aztecs up through the 1850 drainage 
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project, 2) the physical description of the construction, 3) the technical description of 
construction—including geological, chemical, and mechanical descriptions (taking up two 
parts), and 4) a detailed and descriptive financial report. The second volume is an appendix to 
first, including receipts, soil descriptions, and correspondence. The third volume is dedicated to 
maps and cross-sections of the Gran Canal and the projects before it. Independent authors and 
publishers borrowed different sections of the all-encompassing Memoria to disseminate 
information to various target groups: economists, politicians, engineers, architects, scientists, 
and hygienists. Porfirians wanted to show international and local interests that Mexico was 
serious about this modernizing agenda, and these authors and publications made a commotion 
of certain narratives that shone particularly on Mexico's successes in the project. 
 One way that these publications made an example of Mexico as a competent and 
respectable business partner was their affair with the American companies. First, though, the 
question of why the Junta chose foreign firms to tackle the drainage project instead of training 
their own men in engineering, management, and architecture needs to be considered. The most 
prominent científico and Díaz's most trusted adviser, José Yves Limantour, was quoted in the 
Memoria as saying that these foreign men “have acquired enough experience in similar tasks, 
have the tenacity and spirit to see through tasks of this nature, and surpass all difficulties be 
they technical or economic.”97 The use of overseas contracting made the Porfirians seem 
cutting-edge, drawing as they did on the latest foreign technology. It also displayed how much 
more highly the state’s leaders regarded foreign imports than they did home-grown 
knowledge.98 Considering how long it had taken Francisco de Garay—a Mexican architect 
trained in London and Paris —to construct his portion of the Gran Canal in the previous 
drainage project, , Porfirians lost the trust they held for their own people and wanted to work 
directly with the foreign experts who had developed new techniques. 
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Relationships with foreign contractors were not always free of troubles.  The Americans, 
for example, did not display the  “tenacity and spirit” that the Junta was looking for, and the 
contract was dissolved. Rosenda Esperaza, author of the financial section of the Memoria, 
wrote that the Americans found the work to be “not possible...inconvenient and prolonged...and 
[the funds] too insufficient to cover the costs of the works.”99 Esperaza wanted to make the 
Mexican government appear at ease and like an ideal business partner to the readers of the 
Memoria by downplaying the near catastrophe of losing of a contractor. Instead, he stressed the 
amount of modernization and long-term investment needed to confront the difficulties of the 
Valley’s aqueous environment. “The water,” he wrote, “which usually requires ceaseless 
pumping; the water today, specifically in Zumpango, makes the powerful new facilities 
insufficient; the water, finally makes it difficult to calculate successfully the cost of the work in 
the future.”100 By articulating the environmental necessity for trustworthy contractors, Esperaza 
seems to imply that the American companies did not prioritize the Gran Canal project as the 
Porfirians desired. Releasing Read and Campbell and Bucyrus, he argues, was a symbol of 
Mexico’s ability to cast out unworthy service-providers in order to achieve only the best and 
most modern structures for the country. By making this claim, Esperaza suggests the notion 
that the Porfirians found themselves in a better position than Americans, in terms of 
modernizing projects and hydrology. 
 Not surprising, though, was how much this same example was downplayed when this 
material was made for a specifically American audience. The issue of the American companies' 
dissolved contracts was glossed over in the 1901 publication of the Brief Sketch of the Drainage 
of the Valley of Mexico, Written Expressly for the Delegates of the Pan-American Congress, 
and was hardly mentioned in the 1907 Drainage Works in the Valley of Mexico, Information 
Written for the Members of the Society of “American Civil Engineers.” Not wanting to upset the 
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giant of North America, Mexico preferred to demonstrate its superior contracting and 
management skills without being disrespectful. The Mexican government, which in the very 
early twentieth-century controlled a majority of the presses in the Distrito Federal, was pumping 
out propaganda that lured in two different types of people: the type with the technically trained 
eye, keen on making a name in engineering, and the investor, interested in making a profit on 
Porfirian modernization projects. 
 In 1907, the Drainage Works in the Valley of Mexico, Information Written for the 
Members of the Society of “American Civil Engineers” was published inside Mexico City. The 
33-page pamphlet was an abridged translation of some of the Memoria's highlights, released 
seven years after the Canal's stately unveiling, a period which the American engineering 
audience had not received any news. Porfirians wanted to recapture the interests of these 
engineers with a pamphlet dedicated specifically to them. Other factors contextualized the 
significance of the timing: in 1910, the Mexican state would host a great celebration of its 
Independence Day centennial anniversary, which also happened to correspond with Díaz's 80th 
birthday. It is not unusual that the government would begin to catalogue its achievements in the 
years leading up to this event. 
 By bringing attention back to the drainage project, Porfirians hoped to remind engineers 
that Mexican modernizing projects were still ripe for the picking. The country aspired to gather 
the interest of these technically minded individuals, invite them to visit the Gran Canal during 
the celebrations of 1910, and hopefully convince them to invest in their own, new projects for 
Mexico. As the leaders of a country with such a grand accomplishment as the canal, Porfirians 
were eager to be relevant in the conversations about modernization by enticing more projects, 
specifically cash-crops in the lakebeds or other agricultural experiments.101 Even though the 
American companies did not work out initially, Porfirians still invited them to partake in future 
projects. 
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 Publications such as the English-language release of 1907 built on a history of state-
produced literature intended to situate Mexico within the world of advanced nations. Many date 
to the Pan-American conference of 1901. This conference, the second meeting after the first 
convention in 1890-91, was significant for Mexicans since it would be held in their capital. At the 
first conference, held in Washington D.C., a precedent of “economic mechanisms of 
cooperation” was established and the United States presided over the conference as host 
country.102 Key statesmen, as well as economic and cultural representatives, from eighteen 
different countries were present for the first delegation, making a show to each other for 
marketable competition and interest. For as smoothly as the first conference had gone ten 
years prior, the Mexicans believed that the same honors would be bestowed onto them as the 
hosts of the second conference: the same respect and attention that the United States wielded 
would be passed down to its southern neighbor, and they would take advantage of it.  
 From 1901-2, delegates from the U.S., Central, and South America gathered in Mexico 
City, just one year after the completion of the Gran Canal. In a conference that was dominated 
by trade agreements, economic systems, and security/borderland conversations, the Brief 
Sketch of the Drainage of the Valley of Mexico, Written Expressly for the Delegates of the Pan-
American Congress seemed out of place. Another abridged version of the Memoria, the Brief 
Sketch used more description, history, and financial data than the technological processes 
detailed in the 1907 Drainage Works in the Valley of Mexico. Specifically, the Brief Sketch 
focused on describing the Valley of Mexico, previous drainage projects, how the canal was built, 
which materials were used, who the contractors were, how much they spent, and the final 
dimensions of the canal.  
 The audiences that the state was interested in capturing were the politically trained men 
who attended the conference and would want to work with Mexico to make international trade 
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relationships and investments in agriculture. By showcasing the Gran Canal, pointing out its 
colossal features, their knowledge about soils, hydrology, and engineering, and their ability to 
negotiate with multiple and foreign companies for nearly two decades, the Mexican state 
expressed its modernity on an international scale. The Brief Sketch made it clear where the 
State situated itself within the North, Central, and South American continents: “The 17th of 
March 1900 will always be a memorable day on account of the works which were on that date 
inaugurated. [...] It will make of Mexico one of the most agreeable places of residence amongst 
the Capital Cities of the American Republic, for its beauty, salubrity and climate.”103 The Pan-
American conference of 1901, while not receiving the European countries that the científicos 
preferred, still offered Mexico the opportunity to be the dominant country south of the United 
States (given by the way they treated the U.S. companies in some of the publications, it would 
seem that Porfirians might assert that they exceeded the Americans in modern business 
manners). As a dominant country, Mexico hoped to be amongst the other modernizers in the 
world to participate, not as a peripheral country, but as a core economic system.104 
 The Porfirians were not explicitly calling themselves or the state of Mexico modern, but 
they were intentionally expressing their claim to modernity through these and other texts. They 
believed that their Gran Canal would eliminate the status that had haunted the country's past: a 
capital at the mercy of its environment. This was a city that lost one-third of its population to 
disease within a decade's time: 83,000 city residents died between 1867 and 1877, a mortality 
rate that both shamed and charged Díaz and his advisers.105 Their liberal mindset abhorred 
traditional markers that infiltrated and infected their capital city. The mud and filth that floated in 
with storm and flood water was too reminiscent of the countryside to belong in a metropolis. The 
Gran Canal achieved what environmentalist Joel Simon claims to be “one of the most 
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monumental ecological transformations in human history.”106 Perhaps Porfirians were unaware 
of how “monumental” a change their Gran Canal ushered in for the Valley's environment, but 
they were not blind to how impressive their feat was in a history of thousands of years of 
lakeside culture, and their publications made sure that their carefully picked readers 
appreciated this fact as well. 
 
Conclusion 
Even though Mexico had other significant modernization projects completed and gaining 
respect while the Canal was still in construction, Mexican environmental historian, Shawn Miller, 
saw the Gran Canal as the one project that totally encompassed the entire modernization 
package like no other could: “to conquer time and space, the geographic distances and the 
topographic obstacles that stood in the way of extending the tentacles of globalization beyond 
the seaports.”107 In addition to conquering time and space, the Gran Canal worked in 
conjunction with Díaz's goals to create the modern state by attracting foreign investment and 
boosting the confidence of the Mexican government. It is not often that a state can boast about 
controlling a force of nature, and then make a profit from it. 
 It could be argued that the Gran Canal failed to be the great modernizing tool for 
Mexicans because of the continual flooding to the city streets, the eventual rise in urban 
mortality rates, and the inability to create a successful sewage system. Díaz, though, saw the 
Canal as a point of departure for his country, as a real model of modernity and control that the 
Mexican state accomplished in the name of the state and for the health and happiness of its 
future. In truth, Díaz's pride came from taking water—a deadly, unpredictable, and filthy 
character in the national history of Mexico—and taming it into the ideal Mexican citizen. 
 The following chapter will continue the saga of modernity by leaving the heart of Mexico 
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City and looking more closely at individuals. The Canal de la Viga, one of the failed Spanish 
drainage projects that avoided pre-Porfirian, Independence-era demolition, offers a unique 
window for historians to perceive how nature influenced the construction of the modern self. 
Where the Gran Canal firmly rooted the positivist, scientific, and technologically-minded person 
to their belief system, I will argue that the Canal de la Viga imposed a modern individual 
immersed in contradictory relationships between romanticized ideas about modernity and the 
reality of environmental conditions. By doing so, I will answer another crucial question posed by 
Simon and Dooling's vulnerability theory: How are conditions of being vulnerable created and 
perpetuated by uneven, discriminating, and exclusive levels of access to economic resources, 
political power, and strategic alliances?
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CHAPTER 3: 
THE CANAL DE LA VIGA AND MEXICAN MODERNITY 
 
 Cora Hayward Crawford and her family left eastern United States the 1880s destined for 
what she called, “The Land of the Montezumas.”108 She traveled from the top of the state 
Chihuahua down to the coast of Veracruz, but not before she spent several weeks in the 
country's capital, Mexico City. There, she visited churches, ancient architecture, and learned the 
country's history, but it was the chinampas that animated her the most. She wrote, “Perhaps no 
point in Mexico inspires more romantic interest in the heart of the tourist than the so-called 
Floating Gardens; and, therefore, it is with no little enthusiasm that we start on our trip to these 
isles sacred to the memory of early Aztec occupation in the country.”109 Taking a quick trip from 
her hotel in a street-car, she and her travel companions found themselves stepping out onto the 
Paseo de la Viga, at which point they were “beset by a score of vociferous boatmen” who were 
ready to take them down the canal in their decorated boats.110 
 It was not until their guide weeded through the boteros (boatmen) that he found one who 
would charge a reasonable price to take the whole party down the Canal de la Viga and then 
into the chinampas. It was on the canal that Crawford described such relaxation and pleasure 
that readers would surely to wish that they themselves were there next to her: 
“The Viga is exceedingly interesting, with its banks shaded by graceful trees, and with 
its boats passing to and fro, stirring in the breeze. It is a narrow strip of water, intended 
only for small boats, and is the great thoroughfare by which the natives bring in their 
loads of vegetables for the city markets. Our boatman propels us with a sort of gentle, 
undulating motion by pushing with his long pole, now against the shore, now against 
the bottom of the canal, keeping time with snatches of songs interrupted by the 
exchange of sallies with his fellows.”111 
 
Crawford had a fun time at the Floating Gardens once she got there, where she spent the 
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afternoon exploring and making comments about the traditional rituals of the Indians of 
(presumably) old and honorable Aztec heritage. When her party was finished with visiting the 
chinampas, they boarded the boat and floated straight back down the Canal de la Viga, where 
“the novelty of the ride and the scene was too great for monotony,” and then, “unwillingly we 
stepped upon the shore again at the point where we were to take a car to the city.”112 
 Crawford's judgments of La Viga were not unique, as several foreigners visiting Mexico 
City used the Canal de la Viga to gain access to the famous Floating Gardens. In addition to 
travelers enjoying what La Viga had to offer, the neighborhood was also popular with elite 
Mexicans. Contemporary Mexican historian Luis González Obregón mentioned La Viga in a 
description of the Day of the Dead festival in the capital city, setting the people in La Viga in a 
different lens than the rest of the celebrating people.  
 He described the men in the neighboring suburb, La Orilla, as having well-trained 
horses, pure silver buttons, leather and kit-skin pants, and ostentatious ornaments on every 
piece of their clothing. The historian then went on to say, “And the poor people, principally in La 
Viga, how happy they are, how elated, eating candy on the muddy banks of the canal, covered 
endlessly with boats, like flower boxes, manned by natives from the good old days of 
Moctezuma, dressed in their traditional clothing.”113 The description of La Viga begs images of 
nature and simplicity, of a tradition that can be visited and viewed without necessarily needing to 
participate in it. La Viga, in the eyes of the privileged and leisured, was an amusement that 
could not be missed on the itinerary.  
 We discovered in the first chapter that water acted as a deterrent in the process of state 
building, but found in the second chapter that Mexico experienced a moment's peace that 
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allowed Porfirio Díaz to reassess and then control Mexico's natural resources, allowing 
Porfirians to rework the environment in conjunction with state formation efforts. This final 
chapter will look at the continuing relationship between water and society at a more local level 
that reveals contradictions and paradoxes as some Mexicans aspired to modernize according to 
world standards. This chapter examines how the built and natural environment of a 
neighborhood on the outskirts of Mexico City ebbed and flowed with modernization efforts 
according to how individuals interacted with the two different environments. The barrio 
(neighborhood) of La Viga offers a window to view how individuals used their environment to 
construct modern self-images that they thought would reflect Victorian and belle époque culture 
during the latter half of the nineteenth-century. 
 This chapter is comprised of three sections. The first section will be an analysis of 
William Beezley's Judas at the Jockey Club and Other Episodes of Porfirian Mexico. Beezley 
finds that during the Porfirian era the pluralism of the lower class and the upper class became 
stratified and distant in the pursuit of modernization and progress. Focusing on La Viga in this 
chapter, Beezley's argument comes to life as images and descriptions of the canal portray the 
growing schism between los de arriba (“the upper class”) and los de abajo (“the lower class”). 
By combining his ideas about socially-determined culture with people's experiences with the 
environment, Simon and Dooling's vulnerability theory emerges from the folds: los de arriba 
involved themselves with a nature that was built for them in the form of picnic areas, sidewalks, 
and tourist-sized boats, whereas the natives of La Viga settled for the natural environment, the 
“raw” features that allowed them to wash clothes and catch fish, but also being the most 
vulnerable to the pollution that so often plagued the canal. This section will apply vulnerability 
theory to environmental and cultural methods in order to set the stage for La Viga's history 
during the Porfiriato. 
 The second section will describe the birth of La Viga as a canal and then as a popular 
meeting site. Because of its placement close to the city and to the well-traveled lakes within the 
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Basin of Mexico, La Viga grew into a place that was used by a variety of people since colonial 
times and became more than just a canal. Paintings, photographs, poems, and journal entries 
from elites and traveling foreigners reveal that La Viga's environment was important to them in 
remarkably different ways than it was for Vigans themselves.  
 These elite-produced sources evidence Beezley's theory explored in the first section of 
this chapter: the characters in their poems and stories and the subjects in their paintings and 
photographs are separated completely in terms of their social class, which resonated with how 
they used their environment. Elites envisioned themselves apart from nature and included the 
native Vigans as another element of the tourist attraction that is La Viga. By doing so, los ricos 
(the rich) relied on the canal to see Mexico and participate in leisure activities that would 
complement their modern characteristics. The poetry, photographs, paintings, and tourist-driven 
blurbs in advertisements reveal the space as a safe, controlled, and romantic escape from the 
modernity of Mexico City.  
 To conclude, sources from scientists, hygienists, sanitationists, and some visitors reveal 
a different La Viga that at once contradicts yet resonates with the romantic interpretations of the 
place. In reality, La Viga harbored an environment that did not meet the sanitation requirements 
of the Porfiriato, and to some Porfirians, it represented a failure of the state to provide hygienic 
entertainment for its moneyed visitors. This section of the chapter suggests that the schism 
between the rich and the poor was more complicated than Beezley proposed: in the decades 
leading up to the Revolution of 1910, lacerations could be found all over society that divided 
people within their economic and social classes. Furthermore, I propose that the environment is 
one medium that Mexican historians should use in order to reveal these differences, as La Viga 
does with the two very different Porfirian Persuasions. 
 
 
The Vulnerable Environment of Judas  
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 While the Mexican State employed engineers to plan and construct drainage projects 
like the Gran Canal, they had Mexico City and the rest of the Valley of Mexico to look after. 
Regardless of the weather, modernization was still the primary goal, and in the 1890s Porfirians 
decided to change their urban landscape for the betterment of transportation and to 
accommodate city residents. Persuaded by a Philadelphia lumber company, the Porfirian 
government agreed to lay wooden boards down on some of the cobblestone sidewalks and 
streets in the city; by doing so, they hoped to add a couple inches of distance from flood, run-off, 
and inundated sewage waters, as well as add some traction for horses and mules to keep their 
footing. This was also a way to keep the filthy mud and water off the regime's “silver dollar 
wheels” of the newly minted automobiles that drove through the city, a metaphor used in several 
newspapers to describe Mexican prosperity.114 These wooden sidewalks were a source of pride 
for urban architects and Porfirians during the winter, but the first flood of the rainy season 
promptly drowned their egos. The wooden planks of progress were covered with water, swelled, 
and then drifted away down the streets, leaving the naked and gray cobblestones of the 
previous years under flood water and endangering people and animals in the way.115 
 William Beezley uses this anecdote, among many others, in the introduction to his 
monograph Judas at the Jockey Club, and Other Episodes of Porfirian Mexico. Porfirians still 
clung to the imagined success of the wooden sidewalks because, according to Beezley, the 
appearance of progress was more important than its success, “whether or not stone sidewalks 
sprung into the air or blocks of Philadelphia wooden pavement swirled in the water and mud of 
traditional Mexico.”116 In Judas and the Jockey Club, Beezley is most concerned about showing 
how the gap between poor and rich Mexicans was a fundamental part of class-based cultures, 
and of traditional versus modern cultures, during the Porfirian era. He makes the argument that 
while Mexican elites identified as “Positivist European modernists,” poor Mexicans were isolated 
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and discriminated against based on their inability either to access or to resist to the changes 
posed against their traditional lifestyle.117 In the end, the transition from one of the oldest 
standing social dichotomy in Mexico's history—los de arriba and los de abajo—into a standoff 
between cultures significantly influenced the events that tore the Porfirian dictatorship down and 
ushered in the Revolution in 1910. 
 Taking Beezley's argument and combining it with Simon and Dooling's vulnerability 
theory reveals the answer to the question posed at the end of the last chapter, that is, in what 
ways are conditions of being vulnerable created and perpetuated by uneven, discriminating, and 
exclusive levels of access to economic resources, political power, and strategic alliances? 
Beezley describes Mexico as being split into two groups: the traditional, rural, and poor people 
bumping shoulders with the modern, urban, and rich people. This is understood as a long-
standing relationship in Mexican history when Beezley describes that the seating arrangement 
for bullfights in the sixteenth-century was the same as it was in the late nineteenth-century: poor 
people in the sun, rich people in the shade.118 By following a tradition that was steeped in 
colonial traditions, campesinos (“country folk” or “peasants”) continued to bear the brunt of the 
less advantageous circumstances which made them the more vulnerable to their environment. 
The Porfiriato, though, complicated this traditional hierarchy as elite Porfirians expected their 
countrymen to modernize alongside them by accepting newer trends in technology, while at the 
same time perpetuate typical stereotypes about the “Indians” and peasant workers. 
 For example, in Beezley's second chapter, “Rocks and Rawhide in Rural Society,” he 
shares an anecdote that describes the way that the campesinos responded to Porfirian-style 
modernity. When manual laborers were given wheelbarrows to move rocks, dirt, and bricks, they 
would often move them aside and use their more familiar and traditional tools like baskets. Such 
was the case that John Body noted when he described the men moving dirt and rock to make 
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the Gran Canal with only baskets on their backs. Multiple sources from around the country, 
though, remarked that some of these rural workers used the wheelbarrows in a more unique 
and probably more stressful way: “One worker working on the church loaded his wheelbarrow 
with bricks, lifted it onto his head, and trudged over to the masons. After emptying it, he 
replaced the wheelbarrow on his head and returned to the brick pile for another load.”119  
 This comical story may be illuminated by the theory that James Scott proposes in 
Domination and the Art of Resistance. Rural Mexicans participated in a passive-aggressive 
rebellion against the Porfiriato, leaving behind a “hidden transcript,” as Scott calls it, for 
historians to read into and discover more about the subaltern populations of campesinos.120 
Wheelbarrows would not lift all of rural Mexico from poverty, and neither would any other 
modern tool thrust into their hands. Their comfort lay in the traditions of their families and their 
villages, and they held fast to these rituals when Porfirians offered a dizzying amount of 
modernization and rapid change. 
 There are several reasons as to why the people in La Viga chose to do as they did. As 
an analysis of several images will show later in the chapter, Vigans opted to wear more 
traditional clothes—for comfort or because they received more tips by foreigners who wanted 
the full Aztec experience?—and preferred to use more old fashioned methods of labor. The 
most obvious of these was their choice to use the canoe, a form of transportation used as early 
as the Teotihuacanos. Why didn’t they use wagons drawn by horses or mules to pull their goods 
into the city? Why did the campesinos working at the church misuse the wheelbarrows? To 
answer, Beezley writes, “Poverty was hard enough; few wanted to compound this hardship with 
the frustration of vain efforts to change these conditions.”121 In this way, Vigans were vulnerable 
in their environment because they were either incapable of change for lack of opportunity or 
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resistant to modernity because the idea of molding to a different lifestyle was too large a burden 
to bear when hundreds of years of oppression had shown them otherwise. 
 In the absence of more complete sources, this chapter relies on the point of view which 
elites held of Vigans according to their desired experience, meaning that those seeking the 
“Land of the Montezumas” saw Indians unchanged by technology and modernity. In contrast, 
the Porfirians who looked for a way to change La Viga saw the dirty and unsanitary environment 
duplicated by its backwards inhabitants. In this way, though, the perpetuation of the vulnerability 
of the inhabitants of La Viga was certain through the eyes of the privileged; if they were part of 
the fauna, to be admired in their natural habitat alongside the fruits, vegetables, and flowers 
growing in their chinampas, then such was the way of their life and it was meant to be kept as a 
romantic moment in time. Regardless of floods or droughts, both of which affected the canal 
waters, and regardless of the high pollution levels in the canal and the surrounding area, Vigans 
were meant to stay as they were, continuing an existence that served to fulfill elite imaginations.  
In addition to the individuals who held romantic points of view, there were also more 
policy-driven Porfirians who saw La Viga as a hazard to the public health. Putting their desires 
for a picturesque culture aside, these individuals saw that the canal was a place that collected 
disease and brought it into the city, and it was no coincidence that such a hazardous and dirty 
environment, in their eyes, yielded drunken and lazy inhabitants. Porfirians of this nature 
threatened to completely shut down the water-based way of life that Vigans had known for their 
entire lives and depended on. So on the one hand, Porfirians boxed the people of La Viga into a 
stereotype that perpetuated traditional ancient Mexico which, in turn, kept them in a pigeonhole: 
that all poor people were Aztec Indians and backwards with their traditions. But on the other 
hand, distinctly different Porfirians threatened the existence of a way of life preserved by the 
people of La Viga because of the state's beliefs about hygiene and sanitation. Either way, the 
people of La Viga remained at the bottom of the social ladder, and would remain so for as long 
as leisured Porfirians had the time to visit the suburb for their own agendas. 
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 In accordance with Beelzey’s description, though, the lower class and upper class 
Mexicans cohabitated the same space: rural and urban, poor and rich, traditional and modern all 
existed together, but remained separate like oil floating on water. In the same way that los de 
abajo faced the sun during the corridas, the exact same social stratification played out in a 
photograph taken on the banks of the Canal de la Viga in 1885 by photographer American 
William Henry Jackson (figure 1). A boat intended to carry a small amount of passengers stands 
docked by the shore. In front is the botero, or oarsman, dressed plainly and brandishing his 
boat's flag colors for the camera. In the back are two men sitting underneath the boat’s awning, 
enjoying the shade; both of them are wearing suits and bolo hats, smoking cigarettes and 
leaning one elbow outside the boat in a relaxed and comfortable manner. The botero is standing 
in the sun while the men who paid for the excursion are sitting in the shade, exemplifying the 
evidently “natural” social ordering described by Beezley. 
 By using Beezley's conclusions as a jumping-off point, we see that the Mexican 
environment, as well as the nation’s culture, was a critical factor in conditioning the way that 
individuals experienced social ordering and vulnerability. La Viga is one such environment for 
historians to see these constructions that were based on the use of the environment: how 
different people used its waters, who took what water crafts and where they went, and their 
experiences with the Paseo de la Viga and Canal de la Viga differed greatly and inform us how 
modernity influenced people's relationship and interactions with the environment. 
 
The Water and the Walkway 
 There are two histories of the built environment in the town of La Viga: the Canal de la 
Viga, and the Paseo de la Viga. The Canal de la Viga was built in 1750 as part of a greater 
water management plan. Some historians believe that this canal system had been part of the 
pre-Hispanic canals that moved water around their city to help manage flooding and agricultural 
production, and that it later became a part of the colonial system out of convenience or 
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necessity.122 The Canal de la Viga and a few other canals would grant access to a square-like 
moat around Mexico City (figure 2). This moat, never completed, was to serve the purpose of 
controlling storm waters, offering protection to the city, and managing sewage. Additionally, the 
square canal system would have made use of the old waterways that bore trade and 
transportation from around the Valley.  
 If we could take a boat ride on the entire canal system, we would need to pass the towns 
of Culhuacán, Mexicalzingo, Iztacalco, and Santa Anita before embarking on the Canal de la 
Viga and going directly into Mexico City.123 As well, these canals crossed two of the five major 
lakes—Xochimilco and Chalco—to meet up with the main lake on which the city was founded, 
Lake Texcoco. Because of these connections, people far from Mexico City had the opportunity 
to make the commute into a major urban center. Unfortunately, the square canal system never 
quite made the connections it needed to, as was the case with most of the colonial desagüe 
projects. Only one-half of the project was completed, creating an “L” around the northern and 
eastern sides of the city, leaving La Viga as the only major southern access point for people to 
enter the capital via water crafts. 
 The Canal de la Viga was a popular spot for trading because of its placement as the 
city's gatekeeper, and was host to hundreds of boats bearing, among many other things, 
“sesame, grasspea, ocher, sulfur, rice, sugar, calves, cascalote, coffee, coal, sheep, 
barley, beef jerky, Campeche wax, old copper, hides...,  potatoes, salt from Colima, 
ground salt..., snuff..., bulls, [various cows], mahogany, Mexquite, cedar..., beams, 
floors, tables, hinges, foreign brandy, sugar, nails, dried chile, cacao, cognac, printed 
books, mezcal, foreign papers, turpentine, tar, iron, yarn, bran, oak wood, wool, and 
machinery.”124  
 
Casimiro Castro published a lithograph of La Viga in 1855 in the popular picture book México y 
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sus Alrededores, which has been reprinted several times under state tutelage in the last century 
and a half, showing the notable sights and tourist-worthy places in Mexico City (figure 3). Castro 
depicts the many ways of transportation that was associated with La Viga in this single image: 
foot travel, horse, carriage, and at least three different kinds of boats. It is clear by the picture, 
though, that the preferred method to enter the City was through the canal with boats. 
 In 1751, a garita (checkpoint) was established at the end of the Canal de la Viga on the 
border of Mexico City. Here, the state collected taxes on goods, trade and exchange, and for 
passage in and out of the city. Even after the colonial era ended, the garita was necessary to 
organize the flow of trade into the city: from 1858-9, a total of 2,220 water crafts passed through 
the waters of La Viga and into Mexico City.125 The Canal de la Viga remained open and 
functioning when the other canals were covered, filled in, or forgotten during the nineteenth-
century as a result of boat traffic and taxes collected by the Garita de la Viga. Even with the 
invention of the locomotive and the automobile, and the increasing pressure to drain canals to 
replace with streets, the Canal de la Viga stayed where it was, waters flowing, and the garita 
was still collecting its taxes in the late nineteenth-century.126 
 The second part of La Viga is its famous Paseo de la Viga. Built in the late 1700s during 
the colonial age under the Bourbons, the Paseo de la Viga came under the reforms of the Count 
of Revillagigedo, the viceroy of New Spain. The Count's legacy includes many additions to 
Mexico City, including street lights, paved streets, aqueducts, and sanitation laws as he 
intended to make the city into a credible, proud, and attractive colony for Spain.127 The Paseo 
de la Viga became a river walkway that was paved for the easy access of foot-traffic and 
carriages. It was two miles long, had trees lining both sides of it, and even included some 
picnicking areas with benches and tables. The Paseo de la Viga was often thought to be a place 
                                                 
125
  “685 trajineras, 960 de porte, 90 de medio porte y 485 chalupitas;” Peralta Flores, “El Canal de la 
Viga,” 3. 
126
 Ezcurra, The Basin of Mexico: Critical Environmental Issues and Sustainability, 36. 
127
 Peralta Flores, “El Canal de la Viga,” 4. 
63 
 
for leisured people to walk down for amusement, tranquility, and relaxation. For people who did 
not have the time to lounge or go for a stroll, the Paseo was a place to set up markets for 
vendors, dock boats into the canal, and drive teams of horses. 
 One image shows exactly how the Paseo was used for both sides of the social spectrum 
(figure 4). In another state-published book like Castro's, the lithograph “El Paseo de la Viga” 
features los de arriba sitting on stone benches with cigars, hearing stories being told by 
jongleurs, meandering about the Paseo, or walking onto boats for a ride downstream. Los de 
abajo spent time with their privileged counterparts either as said entertainers, as the boteros 
holding the ladies' hands as they walk onto their boats, or as the view that the men smoking 
their cigars can enjoy. The latter scene proves to be particularly interesting when we look at it 
more closely (figure 5). On one side of the canal sits the cigar-smoking gentleman with two 
other companions, cane leaning on his legs, wearing fashionable clothes and bolo hat. He is not 
participating in his friend's conversation, rather his back is turned away from them and he faces 
the viewer. On the other side of the canal is a woman sitting on her knees, washing clothes in a 
stream from the canal. Her own clothes are plain, her head uncovered, and she is focused on 
her chores and not on the man. Interestingly enough, it appears that the man is pointing across 
the stream and directly to her, as if to acknowledge her existence and look upon her labor.  
 It is evident that there is a class distinction between these two individuals: one lounging 
with his friends, the other working alone, one dressed lavishly, the other plainly. Also evident are 
the examples of modern and traditional by the way that the woman is sitting, bent over, on the 
ground, washing her clothes in a stream, whereas the man is sitting upright on a piece of 
furniture. The space between them indicates their separation, but he is also pointing at her 
either with interest, to beckon her, or perhaps in recognition. The simultaneous existence of 
social disparity, as Beezley showed, can be interpreted by his acknowledgment of her; in 
addition, the picture also displays the same incongruity that the two experienced with their 
environment. The impoverished woman is relegated to a space that equates her to her natural 
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surroundings: the stream from the canal, the chore of washing her clothes with the canal water 
directly, and her body seemingly rooted to the ground like the tree next to her. El rico, in the 
meantime, is assigned to an engineered environment that requires maintenance, such as the 
stone bench that he sits on.  
 In this image, the viewer gathers a sense of two worlds coming together: there are 
people who come to visit the canal, to look upon on it, travel around to other cities, and then 
there are people who rely on the canal to do business, complete chores, and earn money. They 
meet with one another, share stories or business, but are separated, as the water separates the 
washerwoman from the smoking rico. It is bold to say that this environment is responsible for 
reproducing these ageless social distinctions; instead, historians need to see how the 
environment reflects them, and to question if it offers a space that might even challenge them. 
Because worldly and traveled visitors sought out La Viga during their travels, both native Vigans 
and elites have the opportunity to see how the other lives—one in a complete state of 
vulnerability, the other privileged to live above risk—and interact with each other.  
 The Paseo de la Viga was constructed alongside the Canal de la Viga and both are built 
environments, but one catered to the men and women who used horse-drawn transportation 
imported from Spain, whereas the other was just an extension of the water that was already 
there and used for centuries before. Because of the way that water and the city built upon each 
other during the colonial era, late nineteenth-century Mexico needed to organize La Viga so that 
it was a useful space for both the state and its citizens while not being reminiscent of 
colonization and oppression. Contemporary ideas about what nature was and what nature ought 
to be influenced the way Porfirians imagined the green-space. 
 
The Modern Landscape 
 Unlike in the case of the Gran Canal, some Porfirians were not concerned with 
completely redirecting the environment of La Viga. Instead, they needed to re-imagine this 
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environment as something that could serve the state more appropriately and would represent 
modernity in the progressive Porfirian way. Mexican historian Mark Overmeyer-Velázquez 
argues that, during the Porfiriato, Mexicans around the country sought ways to honor their 
leader and their nation by building their urban centers in new and more efficient ways. 
Furthermore, he writes, “increasingly rationalizing the city's spatial arrangements meant 
countering the perceived illegibility, the politically autonomous, decentered and ungovernable 
quality of unregulated space.”128 La Viga seemed to be under the state's control by way of the 
garita contributing to the state's revenue, but it was not a coincidence that La Viga became a 
legal part of Mexico City in 1900, the height of the Porfiriato.129 Porfirians desired to have a 
better command over La Viga for two reasons. The Canal de la Viga was a symbol of the 
Spanish Empire, an entity that Mexican elites had fought against only 65 years prior to Díaz's 
ascent to presidency. To add salt to the wound, it was an example of how the Spanish failed to 
service their colonists by way of a possibly pre-Hispanic canal. The colonial establishment 
represented the colonial traditions that Mexico inherited, decidedly non-modern characteristics 
that implied mercantilism, monarchy, and an ultimate failure of control. 
 In addition, the canal also represented anti-modernism in that it remained a popular site 
of activity for transportation and trade when most other canals were turned into roads. Streets 
could be used for the far-more modern forms of transportation such as horses, carriages, and 
automobiles. They could be paved, cleaned, and maintained, whereas the canal was littered 
with dirty and non-draining water, and could not be connected to sidewalks and alleys as streets 
could. The mode of transportation on the canal was not the steamboat but rather the chalupita, 
which is a traditional water craft constructed by thrifty individuals with cheap materials put to 
float down the canal. Just as Beezley argues, the Porfirian Persuasion influenced elites to 
replace traditional or rural modes of life with what they imagined to be more technical and 
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practical. 
 In the eyes of Porfirians, La Viga and its waters were out of their control, which 
potentially threatened their standing as a liberal government; the environment needed to serve a 
purpose other than a crowded trading site used primarily by los de abajo across the lakes. 
Instead of re-purposing the area by filling in the canal and turning it into any other street, 
Porfirians transformed it into something that it already was: green-space. Imagining La Viga as 
green-space, in opposition to an overrun satellite to the urban center, gave the area a purpose 
that served the state more directly by embellishing the environment with a desirable title. 
“Porfirians had a predilection for urban green space,” writes urban historian Emily Wakild, 
“which allowed them to reintroduce nature into their national plans.”130 La Viga served this 
function perfectly as Porfirians continuously manipulated La Viga's environment to yield material 
improvements: instead of creating arable land for agriculture and industry, La Viga cultivated 
leisure space for Porfirians. 
 Many people, Mexican and foreign, visited La Viga and felt so inspired by their vacation 
that they recreated its image in the form of prose, paintings, photographs, or as a memory in a 
journal. Romantic descriptions of this space spread, and the state advertised it in the several 
picture books from this time for tourists to purchase or borrow. The most effective means to 
spread the word about La Viga, though, was in the multiple written descriptions made for 
travelers and curious Mexicans alike. In one of these descriptions, written by the well-published 
Manuel Rivera Cambas in his Mexico Pintoresco Artistico y Monumental, the “picturesque” 
quality of La Viga is laid out: 
“the canal travels between buildings whose balconies and windows allow for them to 
enjoy the picturesque spectacle that is offered by the canoes filled with produce and 
flowers, and similarly, the greater bundles moved by the oar of the indígena; in the 
canal slips the canoes, almost without rowing, and crosses some indígena kneeling 
beside the rustic crib of his child, and then the grand wooden rafts appear that the city 
uses to lead people here.”131 
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Rivera's experience was hardly unique since the Canal de la Viga served more than just los de 
arriba, but also stood as a place that people could use to complete their chores. Besides a 
place for boteros, the canal was used for fishing by men and women did their laundry in streams 
that were carved out from the main canal.  
 The poems of Guillermo Prieto Pradillo remained popular and a source of pride for 
Mexicans as he drew his inspiration from local scenes and events. In his poem “Paseo de la 
Viga,” he describes another exciting and exotic scene for foreigners to look forward to if they 
visited the canal: “In the transparent canal/ranked as the best/are the fandango canoes/that 
traverse the current./There go the people like pineapple/and there go their joyful songs/and 
tenacious dancers/who gather as in a fight./Two Indians at the ends/drive the boat/and provide 
directions with their oars.”132 The poem goes on to describe the cries in the song, the costumes 
that the dancers wear, and how all of this can be seen from the shores on the Paseo. The bright 
description and the prospect of seeing a traditional dance performed on a boat from the safety 
of the walkway was enticing, and left the imagination eager for these kinds of sights. 
 Although the canal was initially intended for lower class people to use for transportation 
in and out of the city, it was with descriptions found in Pradillo's poem, Castro's painting, and 
Cambas' book that drew the Porfirian Persuasion, or the state sponsored high culture, out of 
most of the upper class visitors. Mary Ashley Townsend kept close notes of her first experience 
floating down the canal, commenting on the culture shock she felt between herself and the 
residents of La Viga. She believed that what she saw could have been a scene straight from 
“the Aztec days.” She wrote, “The same sort of boats propelled by the same sort of people 
moved upon the water, and the door of our carriage seemed to have admitted us into a place 
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and among the avocations belonging to three centuries ago.”133 La Viga served to the upper 
class as a leisure space for them to participate in what they believed to be ancient pastimes in a 
safe and romanticized way.  
 There exists an imaginary relationship between the privileged, white European 
descendant and the vintage, brown Mexican, in which white individuals romanticized the 
activities of the “Indians” and made them resonant with Republican ideals, such as thriftiness, 
hard work, and nationalism.134 Townsend was not disgusted by the women washing their clothes 
in a stream, even though she herself would have been unlikely to wear Viga-water clothes; 
rather, she writes that it was not out of the ordinary to see women using streams to wash 
clothes. She gives the poor women the benefit of being hard workers and using whatever 
means they had to complete their chores, but still keeping herself distant enough to remain a 
viewer.  
 Photographers set themselves up on the banks of the canal, on different boats, or on top 
of bridges along the canal to capture moments in La Viga. Some photographs, like the one of 
women washing clothes captured anonymously in 1900, are candid and aspire to capture the 
everyday affairs of La Viga (figure 5). Other photographs aim to catch the follies of the elite on 
their vacations, such as a picture caught in 1900 of a boat of eight upper class women (figure 
6). Everyone, including the botero, is facing the camera; the women are smiling, waving their 
hands or their kerchiefs at the photographer; a man at the front of the boat has his own camera 
turned to the photographer, maybe taking a picture of the women's escorts who were left behind 
on the Paseo. Perhaps they, too, are waving at their wives or daughters, returning their smiles. 
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Regardless, comparing this image of the women on the boat to the women washing clothes 
further proves the coexistence of people in shared spaces, but also shows the specific 
separation in wealth in the way that the two parties spend their time. One clearly enjoyed the 
prospects of being watched and took the time to pose for a picture, while the others were so 
consumed in their work that they did not seem even to take notice of the photographer's 
presence. 
 The American engineer, painter, and writer, Francis Hopkinson Smith, took on the same 
spectator position that Townsend and the photographers exhibited upon interacting with the 
people in La Viga. By focusing on their work habits, Smith made the Vigans in his story, “La 
Canal de la Viga,” appear innocent and forgave their backwardness with colorful descriptions 
that combined work with beauty. In addition to this, though, he also described them as creatures 
completely different from him and in need of documentation and description. In a sketch he 
dedicated to la Viga, he observed a resident in the canal working, idealizing her appearance:  
“If you think grace died with the Greeks, watch this girl for a moment. She is barely 
sixteen; her eyes are dark and luminous, her hair a purple black, tied in two great 
braids down her back; her teeth white as milk; her neck, arms, and bust exquisitely 
modeled; her fingers small and tapering, and her feet tiny enough to dance on Persian 
carpet. She has a skin that is not the red of the Indian, nor brown, nor quadroon; it is 
light as though transparent copper.”135 
 
This woman turned into his muse as he saw all the fine qualities that the Mexican Republic had 
to offer under the Porfiriato. She was young and beautiful and her body mirrored her hard work, 
which in turn was a reflection of the healthy state of the nation. In his story, this girl is unaware 
of her admirer, for she has but one task while at La Viga, “to sell her cargo before the hot sun 
shall shrivel it up.”136 With this in mind, this “daughter of Montezuma,” symbolized the great 
potential that lower class Mexicans had to be proud of themselves and do good work for their 
country. 
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 Emphasizing her supple body, the many ethnicities in her skin, and the very minute 
details of her body comes off as borderline erotic, and it would appear that he is making the 
woman to be some kind of Constitutive Other, sexually and ethnically. She is very much the 
object for the subject to look upon and discover for his or her pleasures. Even though her body 
and actions recall to his mind foreign civilizations, Smith writes of them in a way that is separate 
from her as if to solidify that she only works to remind him of the Persians or Greeks and not 
embody them wholly. 
 Delving into how Smith's story made Vigans disconnected from him becomes further 
complex when his object—the young botera—is placed back into her environment, the setting of 
the story. Here, the characters can “revel only in the sunlight, the palms waving over the low 
walls, the blazing, dazzling white of the great building opposite, the deep blue of the sky 
overhead, and the superb carpet of color dotted with figures beneath.”137 It is only in the midst of 
the “mass of blue lakespur and ragged sailors” that his eyes fall upon their object, as if implying 
that without her true nature around her, the girl would have passed by without being noticed. La 
Viga's environment created such a stark difference between the way that people interacted with 
their surroundings that Othering practically falls into Smith's lap. He is forced to observe the 
woman from afar, because they are separated by water; she sells the produce grown in her 
garden, giving her an earthy aura that Smith picks up on; she is participating in a tradition, that 
of food vending, that people in the Valley of Mexico have performed for hundreds of years, 
making her seem all the more exotic to him. 
 The next couple of lines, though, collared Smith's true intent: “Every moment is grace 
itself. That she comes of an indolent race only adds to her beauty.”138 Here, Smith reveals the 
paradox embodied by the Porfirian Persuasion as it floated down La Viga by acknowledging her 
as an ethnic Other who is handcuffed to a natural, ancient environment from her imagined past. 
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While Porfirians preferred modern amenities such as technological advancements that allowed 
for European leisure activities, they still relied on traditional hierarchies which required some 
people to remain endlessly at the bottom of society. The “indolent race” that Smith refers to can 
only be the lower class natives of Mexico, Pradillo's rowing Indians, the washer woman in the 
“Paseo de la Viga” painting. Regardless of how hard she worked, Smith's woman would always 
have this identity as long as she worked a food boat on the Canal de la Viga. 
 
The Modern Reality  
 La Viga was a space occupied by the upper and lower class at the same time, one 
always in the presence and constant observation of the other, as Smith and Townsend made 
clear in their detailed accounts. Elites and visitors idealized their experiences and it would seem 
that they had an enjoyable, if not entertaining, time on the banks of the canal. But another 
memory of la Viga emerges from the journal of America businessman David Hunter Strother. In 
August of 1879, Strother and his friend took a walk from their temporary homes in Mexico City 
to La Viga, where he concluded that “This is a dirty neighborhood...naked & partially occupied 
by ponds of Green [sic] & muddy water. Grim [sic] old walls, Massive Churches [sic], crumbling 
& weedy walls, deserted & half ruinous buildings.”139 Strother's view of La Viga is an entirely 
different world from Smith's bright and bustling descriptions, stripped of all the romance and 
sunshine.  
 Strother described the Paseo and Canal de la Viga as “a broad muddy & ill kept drive 
along the banks of the muddy canal with double rows of shade trees, not very thrifty, & rude 
stone benches & seats, pulque shops, Eating [sic] & amusement gardens, swampy flats 
growing cane cactus & corn yards & wretched adobe tenements.”140 He did not see the 
hardworking Indians participating in republican goals, but rather the “fifty lusty fellows [who] 
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were drinking [in the Pulque Shop] & talking somewhat noisily” and the boteros who tried to take 
advantage of the white tourists by over charging them for a ride down the canal.141 This is the 
image of La Viga that the Porfirians involved in policy-making saw: a dirty, decaying village that 
represented the failures of the state to provide a habitable space. 
 It is difficult to remember that the water that flows through the Canal de la Viga is the 
same water that plagued the city with disease and filth, over flowing the streets, and the cause 
of flooding. The closed water system in the Basin of Mexico resulted in shared water streams 
throughout the city and its satellite neighborhoods, and even though La Viga was remembered 
by some people as a handsome and fun place to watch market goers, boteros, and other 
peones, they neglected to remember some of its more foul characteristics. Even Smith writes, 
after leaving the botera in the canal, that “You begin to note the foul water strewn with waste 
leaves, decayed fruit, and the offal of the market. You become aware of the stench and the 
reeking filth...You turn in disgust to enter the stifling market, where barelegged peons are 
drenching the foul stone flags [sic] with fouler water from the canal...”142 The water that flowed 
through the canal was probably not clean and the leading cause for stench and grime; not only 
was it used to clean dirty laundry, but it was also a waste site for restaurants, shops, and 
people's homes. The canal collected the debris from the Paseo, and considering how much 
waste accrued on that road from people and their animals, the canal must have been very full 
already from other-waterly debris.  
 Recall the lithograph from before depicting all of the people who used the area to deploy 
their boats and imagine the high degree of litter and debris left behind from the crafts using the 
canal and the Paseo alone (figure 3). People would anchor their boats to either side of the 
shore, lined up, back to front for two miles, and sell their goods. Not only was the water sullied 
from the trash and movement from the canal-side market, but the canal was used for other 
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chores, such as the washer women and the fishermen. Like most other sources of moving 
water, the canal was probably used by locals to toss sewage in, take baths, and remove trash 
from their homes and businesses. When the Paseo was cleaned—even if Strother claims that 
was ill-kept—the debris from carriages, horses, people, and animal herds was all swept into the 
canal. La Viga was still part of the Basin of Mexico water system, the very one that does not 
naturally drain. The Canal de la Viga presented a similar problem that the flood waters in the 
capital did: the waste combined with the water emitted horrible smells that were uncomfortable 
and uninviting, if not dangerous and harmful according to the popular beliefs held by 
sanitationists about filth and atmosphere.  
 Emerging from the new sciences discussed in chapter two was a split between the goals 
and accomplishments of Porfirians, creating subdivisions within Porfirians themselves. In fact, 
Beezley addresses the fact that a “Porfirian” identity was slippery. Upon describing the mix of 
religious, political, and economic identities of Mexican elites, Beezley writes that “these 
predilections constituted a somewhat ill-defined but pervasive popular sense of what a number 
of Mexicans thought about their country and future.”143 For this reason, he makes the argument 
that Mexican elites were under a persuasion that was controlled by the popular culture 
maintained by the Porfirian state, hence the “Porfirian Persuasion.”  
 Beezley's points are well taken, but are complicated by Charles Hale's work, The 
Transformation of Liberalism in Late Nineteenth Century Mexico. Hale follows the indisputable 
argument that something changed in the nineteenth-century that led to a shift in politics, that 
Porfirio Díaz required a different type of policy making in his government. The former 
government under Benito Juárez head started some of the liberal qualities Díaz was looking for: 
free-market economy and the denouncement of Church authority.144 In order to accelerate the 
capitalist transition begun in Mexico under Juárez, Díaz looked for certain characters that would 
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help him place Mexico in the same ranks as Europe and the United States, people who used 
the modernizing rhetoric and who followed the leading discourses about city planning and state-
formation. These were mostly men, who self-identified as “journalist-intellectuals,” received their 
education from abroad, adhered to French positivism under Auguste Comte and Henri de Saint-
Simon, and exemplified conservative-liberalism.145 Modernity was not the exclusive domain of 
politicians and scientists, however, and shared conceptions of modernity bridged the gap 
between these policy-Porfirians and socialite-Porfirians. Their shared faith in cutting edge 
technology, the desire to go faster and farther with less effort, following trends from Europe and 
America, and a distrust of traditional institutions are the major commonalities that present a 
united front for Porfirians in the government and in society. 
 The canal waters were a challenge to policy-Porfirians' efforts to control the environment 
and provide an appropriate space for socialite-Porfirians to enjoy their time off. Instead of 
offering a green space that featured small streams rolling through gardens, water fountains with 
blooming stone roses, or small ponds with wildlife and lily pads by reading benches, the waters 
of the canal were so untamed that, left to their own devices, they were a symbol of Mexico's 
historical Indian past. It was too narrow to allow for steam boats or even big and luxurious 
watercrafts. It was too popularly used by the locals as an outdated mode of transportation to fill 
in without causing too much of a commotion, and it also still collected a small amount of 
revenue that the state could use. What were these Porfirians to do with this mess? 
 The answer: they did nothing. It remained a dark smudge on their agenda that they 
could do nothing about except color La Viga as a tourist destination and nothing more. The 
state sent scientists, hygienists, sanitationists, and physicians to La Viga to conduct 
experiments on the water and soil, which would amount to nothing for Porfirians. It was not until 
five years after Porfirio Díaz fled the country in 1910 that La Viga was labeled a “high risk zone” 
for the public's health, and then, in the 1930s, the process began to drain the canal and replace 
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it with a road.146 
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Figure 1: No Title, Henry Jackson Turner, 1885. Boats intended to 
take tourists down the canal were set up in the same way that 
traditional corridas were, with the privileged boat-rider seated under 
the awning, and working class botero in the sun.  
Figure 2: “Plano iconográfico de la Ciudad de Mexico” by Ignacio Castera, indicating 
what the square canal was intended to look like. Only a portion of it was completed, half of 
the south-eastern corner, which connected to the Canal de la Viga. 
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 Figure 3: “Canal de la Viga,” Casimiro Castro, 1855. Both upper and lower classes used 
the Canal de la Viga and the Paseo de la Viga for a variety of reasons and in multiple ways, 
whether it was walking or riding down the Paseo, or taking bus boats, tourist canoes, or personal 
water crafts down the canal.  
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Figure 5:  “Paseo de la Viga,” Album 
Mexicano,1885. close up A closer look at “Paseo de la 
Viga” reveals more of a connection than initially seen 
between all of the people in the painting. 
 Figure 4: “Paseo de la Viga,” Album Mexicano,1885. People used the Paseo de la 
Viga nearly as much as they used the Canal de la Viga for a variety of reasons. This 
lithograph shows the many ways that both rich and poor Mexicans spent their time in La 
Viga. "Paseo de la Viga," Album Mexicano, 1885 
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Figure 7: “Canal de la Viga in Santa Anita,” 
Anonymous, 1900. Women on a boat float down the canal, 
posing for their picture to be taken probably from shore or 
from a bridge somewhere downstream.  
Figure 6: No Title, Anonymous, nineteenth-
century. Women washing clothes in dug out 
streams of the canal was not an unusual sight for 
tourists.  
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EPILOGUE 
La Calzada de Viga 
 By the 1920s, the water level in the Canal de la Viga was considerably lower than it used 
to be as a result of the Gran Canal and the sinking of the city. Reasons listed for draining and 
then filling in the canal varied from flood warnings, to public health hazards, to the general 
unattractiveness of La Viga without its quintessential chalupitas and festivals. It would seem that 
the Mexican sentiment was, again, divided on how it felt about the closing of the canal. This 
time, it would not matter what the popular opinion was. Alejandro Tortolero Villaseñor writes, “In 
the end, it is obvious that the league composed of Richardson, Pearson, the Noriegas, Cuesta 
Gallardo, the young scientists, medics, and engineers would be more powerful than Ramos' 
pencil, Prieto's pen, and the delicious revelry of the people.”147 In the late 1930s, the canal was 
completely covered and converted into a street, the Calzada de Viga. It was outfitted with 
streetcar tracks, cobble paved roads, and sidewalks in front of the shops. The festivals ceased, 
and the foreign elites no longer sought out the Canal de la Viga to experience the romanticized 
customs of Mexico's native past. 
 Although the vast amount of leisure space was destroyed, the Calzada de Viga did 
manage to maintain some of the traditions that the Canal de la Viga preserved: el mercado de la 
Viga (La Viga Market) is, present day, one of the best spots in the city to buy fresh fish, and the 
mercado de Jamaica blossomed in the 1950s as a result of the need to restore the agricultural 
requirements of the locals. Today, the mercado de Jamaica specializes in flowers. La Calzada 
de Viga recently emerged as another tourist destination in the capital, according to some tourist 
guides, but the number of tourists visiting the mercados will never match the amount of people 
who used and visited the Canal de la Viga on a good day.148 
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Thirty-four Feet Deep 
 While scientists and engineers assumed their victory over the Canal-turned-Calzada de 
la Viga, they woefully lost the war against the water system in the Valley of Mexico. What once 
was hailed as the bringer of modernity to Mexico is hidden from the public today. The Gran 
Canal is no longer the tourist attraction that it used to be. It cannot be easily found and remains 
untitled and unmarked on maps or signs in the city. Upon discovering its current location, Shawn 
Miller wrote that “the canal stinks of musty sweetness, and has, due to the mixing of excrement, 
urine, rinsed soap, industrial effluent, and dissolved toilet paper, sewage's characteristic gray 
color. Rotting pipes set in ranks along the canal's edge send surging charges of foamy liquid 
crashing onto the water's surface.”149 Joel Simon described the water as “black sludge,” writing 
that “the sludge carried by the [Río de los Remedios] backed up with the canal, forming an 
enormous swamp of sewage that spread over acres.”150 The three goals of the Gran Canal—to 
prevent flooding, drain the lakes, and send waste water out of the City—failed in different 
measures and for different reasons.  
 An inundated Mexico City in 1900, 1901, and 1910 proved that the Gran Canal did not 
prevent the flooding that it promised to. To Díaz's embarrassment, the flooding happened during 
the country's centennial Independence Day celebrations; Porfirians hoped that their esteemed 
guests would not notice the sandbags lining the streets and walkways.151 It was not until after a 
flood in 1952 that the Mexican government agreed to place pumping stations around the city 
that would lead flood waters away.152 This consumed massive amounts of power and electricity, 
however, leaving the city vulnerable when the pumps broke down and water would quickly 
overwhelm the water works and stop up the streets.  
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 The pumps acted as a quick solution while another great desagüe was laid out. In 1959 
plans were drafted for a deep drainage tunnel, one that would be 198m deep with a length of 
over 80km. The construction began in 1967 and the project was finished in 1975, when yet 
another Mexican president, José López Portillo, opened a new set of flood gates with the 
promise to end flooding. The mayor of Mexico City, Octavio Sentíes Gómez (1971-1976), said in 
his speech at the new desagüe’s inauguration, “In the years before the nationalist Revolution of 
1910 when the Gran Canal was inaugurated you heard names like Reed, Campbell, Harris, 
Pearson. Today, neither these names nor other similar ones appear in the credits. This work 
was made by Mexicans.”153 It was not until the 1980s when the new drainage project was fully 
functioning. 
 The reason as to why this drainage system was built so deep underground was in 
response to another problem that created a vulnerable capital: the city was sinking, including 
the Gran Canal. A system that initially shuttled water at a rate of 90m3/sec is now reduced to 
7m3/sec.154 Since Hernán Cortés first encountered Tenochtitlan, the area has sunk 
approximately 10m and recent calculations show that since the 1950s, the city sinks more than 
3ft every year.155 The growing population required more wells to bring people fresh water. In 
1900 there were 1000 known wells constructed in the city, whereas now, there are 4820 wells 
pumping 11,000 gal/sec of water.156 Initially, Porfirians and their future followers believed that 
draining the lakes would help to dry out the spongy soil and create a firm ground for urban 
infrastructure, but it did just the opposite and created an environment that made the city sink. 
The state first recognized the sinking in 1925, but did not attribute it to the wells and diminishing 
underground aquifer until 1946.157 Their solution was to try to reduce water use in the city and 
import water from outside the Valley of Mexico but this posed a problem. The physical difficulties 
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of bringing water from outside the valley, over the hills and mountains, and into the aquifer 
would prove to be an expensive challenge. In fact, 10% of Mexico City's total output of energy is 
drained by the city's water management: pumping fresh water in while leading waste water 
out.158 
 The waste waters were, in fact, sent out of the city and into the Tula Valley as planned by 
the Porfirians in 1900. The Tula Valley is now the biggest irrigation area utilizing waste water in 
the world.159 Unfortunately, though, the city's 52m3/s stream of raw waste water is mostly 
untreated by the time it discharges into the Tula Valley, making infections from bacteria, such as 
hookworm, rampant amongst individuals who use water for personal use in the Tula Valley or 
consume any kind of agricultural product that is irrigated with the water.160 The issue of treating 
the waste water is contested in the Tula Valley: on the one hand, it has rich stores of organic 
matter that farmers want to use to irrigate their fields, but on the other hand, there are an 
estimated 350 water sources (both man-made and natural) that supply over 500,000 people 
with drinking water that has been contaminated with the agricultural water.161  
 Treating the water would necessarily include the Mexican government’s spending part of 
its revenue researching and constructing sanitation plants, as well as farmers changing a style 
of life that they have practiced for over a century (much like requiring Vigans to adapt to a life 
without their Canal). With the water left untreated, people became sick. As was mentioned 
before, hookworm is common among areas that rely on untreated waste water, but also cases 
of E. coli and other bacterial infections are common as well. Simon goes as far as to suggest 
that a cholera outbreak in the Mezquital Valley in 1991 was a result of the Valley's reliance on 
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the waste waters of Tula.162 According to the interviews that he had with farmers in the areas—
even with some who experienced cholera attacks themselves—supported the Valley's 
commitment to keeping the irrigation waters untreated. One farmer said to Simon, “'the black 
waters [from the Gran Canal] don't do anything bad...We will never let the authorities take them 
away from us.'”163 While the hazards of consuming vegetation grown in raw sewage has yet to 
be documented from the Tula Valley, the daily and long term exposure to the waste water makes 
both people and the environment vulnerable to degradation and death. 
Conclusion 
 Using the Gran Canal and the Canal de Viga as case studies, his thesis set out to 
explore the intersections between environment, environmental management, and state 
formation in the context of the scientific, progress-oriented liberalism of the Porfirian era in 
Mexico.  Various actors emerged who played critical roles in the dialogue between environment 
and society, and even though most these actors are no longer around to see the end results of 
their labors or leisures, a commonality emerges: their interconnectedness in environmental 
vulnerabilities. Just as the Vigans continued to expose themselves to the murky waters of the 
canal to sell their goods, present day lower class Mexicans stand up for their access to water 
that make them ill and contaminate their food, drinking water, and land. This cycle may not have 
the same explicit racial connections that they did during the Porfiriato, but the social connection 
is still there: the campesinos must endure an unsafe environment, not safeguarded or regulated 
by their government, which thereby connects them to the “natural” environment as their Indian 
predecessors did in 1900. “Liquid liberalism,” as I have called the collection of Porfirian projects 
and attitudes surrounding the Gran Canal and the Canal de la Viga, hurt the environment, failed 
to solve the Valley’s problems, and perpetuated differences of class and race that remain within 
Mexican society to this day. 
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 This cycle of exposing poor populations to hazardous environments and perpetuating the 
vulnerability of an entire class of people to the environment could be broken should Mexican 
officials choose to end it. In fact, some authorities are getting creative in trying to solve the 
multifaceted water problems in their capital; treated waste water now fills the dried Lake 
Texcoco as an effort to control the dust storms that rage through the Valley and capital during 
the dry season. The treated waste waters also prove promising for the return of the old ecology 
from before the desagües; birds from Northern lands in the U.S. and Canada migrate down to 
the lake during the winter, showing that vegetation thrives on this waste water. This might prove 
that the treated water can be used for agricultural purposes, as well as for healthy and safe 
human use.164 
 In an attempt to analyze the effects that Porfirian water projects had on the environment, 
this thesis discovered that the environment itself was also a protagonist in historical change.  In 
essence, the environment served as a “landscape” that was navigable via social classes and 
that influenced state formation, a fact that has existed since people in the Valley of Mexico 
began manipulating their water system on a large scale. William Beezley's argument that the 
growing schism during the Porfiriato between rich and poor Mexicans by cultural means can 
also be extended to environmental separations, as los de abajo  were ostracized by los de 
arriba to the point of being depicted as if they grew out of the ground like the trees surrounding 
the canal. The Gran Canal, too, symbolized specific Porfirians' relationship to their habitat in the 
Valley, but as opposed to being forced to coexist with that vulnerability, they desired to bring the 
waters under their control and usher in modernity in their wake. Their failure, in a long line of 
their ancestor’s failures, has had consequences that makes Mexicans today just as, if not more, 
vulnerable to their environment as they were centuries ago. 
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